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ABSTRACT 
The Middle East plays a vital role in the world economy.  Resource rich, it 
provides much of the energy that the advanced industrialized societies need to keep their 
economies growing.  Challenges in the region lie on the horizon, however, and are 
beginning to take shape today.  These challenges, if left unresolved, could create more 
regional instability and could have far-reaching consequences.  The United States faces 
its own challenges in the coming years.  Demographic trends and budgetary concerns call 
into question the ability of the United States to lead in the coming decades. 
This thesis examines the confluence of issues facing Middle Eastern countries 
today, while also linking demographic trends currently underway in the United States 
with the country’s ability to fulfill its on-going role in the Middle East.  In so doing, it 
assesses the impact of an aging America on the federal budget and the ramifications of 
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The Middle East today is dealing with a confluence of issues that, if left 
unresolved, could foment political instability, economic stagnation, and social repression 
in the coming decades.  For some this would appear to be more of the same for a region 
that has yet to fully integrate itself in the global community of states, a region that is 
struggling with its identity.  Due to its energy resources, position as the crossroads 
between three continents, and rich cultural heritage, a stable Middle East has much to 
offer the rest of the world.  The forces of globalization and free market economics have 
integrated the world in a way that has never been seen before.  Wealth creation, although 
not enjoyed and appreciated by all countries, has lifted many civilizations out of poverty 
and on the road to developed nation status.  This post World War II phenomenon relies 
significantly on the free flow of crude oil to world markets, oil found in abundant supply 
in the Middle East. 
 No country is without its challenges.  Middle Eastern countries certainly have too 
many to name here, not least of which includes political institutions led by autocrats or 
theocrats who struggle to find a balance between historical identity and the distribution of 
riches possible within a global economic system or, in some cases, to hang on to power. 
The countries at the fore of the globalization effort, primarily the advanced 
industrialized societies of Asia and the West, have their own challenges to face.  As 
modern welfare states, Western societies are beginning to come to grips with the 
potentially crippling effects of a dwindling population.  As the population ages, it leaves 
in its wake a smaller number of people to provide the tax base for entitlement spending.  
In turn, a strain is put on the ability of the welfare state to make good on past promises 
largely considered part of a social contract between the state and its people.  Said another 
way, the challenge of providing for the elderly could lead to political instability as the 
promises formerly made by the state become more difficult to fulfill. 
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Demographic trends are certainly not an anomaly that only the West has to face.  
On the contrary, all across the globe countries are facing challenges of population growth 
and decline.  Unlike the developed industrialized countries of the world that are facing 
the prospects of societies in decline as a result of aging and receding populations, the 
developing world is dealing with a preponderance of countries facing rapid increases in 
population. 
 The challenges facing growing countries like those found in the Middle East are 
well documented.  Issues include job opportunities when the young enter adulthood, the 
ability of the state to provide even basic services and infrastructure to the growing 
population, and the question of whether resources as basic as water will be abundant 
enough to sustain the growth.  Combined, these challenges could lead to political 
instability and the possible collapse of the state. 
 The one country that seems best positioned to weather the storm is the United 
States.  Although its population will age in the coming decades, putting exceptional strain 
on the entitlement programs promised to the elderly, the U.S. population is projected to 
grow.  What effect will the strain on entitlements have on the ability of the United States 
to conduct foreign policy abroad, primarily from a military perspective?  Will the United 
States struggle to maintain its military dominance around the globe and, most 
importantly, in the Middle East?  What challenges will the U.S. face when attempting to 
provide stability in this rather unstable region, and how will the troubles facing America 
at home affect its efforts abroad?  These questions and more will be answered in this 
thesis. 
B. WHY THIS STUDY IS IMPORTANT 
The sources of concern in the Middle East are well-documented and play out 
every day in the media here in the United States.  Extremist ideologies, sectarian 
violence, and American body counts in Iraq are constantly reported alongside images of 
suicide bombers, flags burning, and public protesters proclaiming the death of America.  
The images have become so engrained in the heads of most Americans as to make them 
numb, and with an election year rolling around in 2008, national security is a high 
interest agenda item amongst voters.  In November 2006, Democrats retook control of 
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both chambers of Congress from the Republicans who held power since the early years of 
the Clinton Administration.  Democrats saw this as a mandate to bring an end to the war 
in Iraq and as a right to more overtly challenge the policy decisions made by the Bush 
Administration, but the war on terror is drowning out the noise of what is arguably an 
even larger issue facing the people of America today.  This larger issue, if not dealt with 
sooner rather than later, will have a rippling effect that crosses generations of Americans 
for years to come. 
In 2004 and early 2005, four books were published that dealt with demographics 
either head on or tangentially.  Combined, these books helped shed light on important 
elements of this thesis, some of which are purely demographic in nature and some of 
which are government responses to these pressures.  A short synopsis of these four books 
is provided below. 
1. The Empty Cradle:  How Falling Birthrates Threaten World Prosperity and What 
to do About It (Longman):  This book discusses the role that fertility rates and 
population growth have as a major source of economic growth.  Longman also 
attempts to prove that depopulation can be the cause of economic stagnation.  
Since the majority of societies today facing depopulation are secular, well-
educated societies, he claims that the cost of children and the cost of an aging 
society will slow these countries’ pace of progress.1 
2. Fewer:  How the New Demography of Depopulation Will Shape Our Future 
(Wattenberg):  Ben Wattenberg’s book analyzes the geopolitical, environmental, 
and world economy implications of a shift from population growth to population 
decline.  As the inside flap of his book tells the reader, the United States may find 
itself with weaker allies who have ever-greater proportions of Muslim voters.  
Additionally, Europe may not be able to maintain its economic strength without 
vast numbers of immigrant workers – workers they have resisted allowing into 
their countries.2 
                                                 
1 Phillip Longman, The Empty Cradle: How Falling Birthrates Threaten World Prosperity and What 
to Do about It (New York: Basic Books, 2004), inside cover. 
2 Ben J. Wattenberg, Fewer: How the New Demography of Depopulation Will Shape Our Future 
(Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2004), inside cover. 
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3. The Coming Generational Storm:  What You Need to Know about America’s 
Economic Future (Kotlikoff and Burns):  This book doubles as a demography 
book coupled with a fiscal policy book.  The authors spend time discussing past, 
current, and future demographic trends in the United States and the fiscal burden 
these trends will have on future generations left to carry the burden.  They state 
that by 2030 the collective population of the United States will be older than that 
in Florida today, that there will be twice as many retirees (as in 2004) but only 18 
percent more workers to support them, and that there will be more strollers than 
walkers.3  Together, they argue, these trends will put America in a position that it 
will have an impossible task of growing out of without drastically increasing taxes 
on future generations. 
4. Running on Empty:  How the Democratic and Republican Parties are 
Bankrupting Our Future and What Americans Can Do About It (Peterson):  The 
Chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations, Peter Peterson has written a book 
that takes an in-depth bi-partisan look at both political parties in an effort to 
explain the track of America’s economy.  Specifically, he explains the 
ramifications of a ballooning domestic deficit coupled with a large trade deficit 
and what it all means when coupled with a baby boom generation that will make 
unprecedented demands on entitlement programs such as Social Security and 
Medicare.4 
Together these four books portray an alarming account of what faces the United States in 
the coming decades.  Whether one believes the arguments made in these books or not, it 
is difficult to avoid the demographic crisis that looms ahead and the far-reaching 
implications of doing nothing about it in the short and medium term.  What is potentially 
at stake is the U.S. economy in future years.  A weak economy burdened with debt and 
large scale increases in entitlement spending is damaging to the nation’s security as well 
as the global economy.   
                                                 
3 Laurence J. Kotlikoff and Scott Burns, The Coming Generational Storm: What You Need to Know 
About America’s Economic Future (Boston: MIT Press, 2005), xvii. 
4 Peter G. Peterson, Running on Empty: How the Democratic and Republican Parties are Bankrupting 
Our Future and What Americans Can Do About It (XYZ: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2004), inside cover. 
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C. WHAT THIS STUDY IS AND WHAT IT IS NOT 
This thesis is both international and domestic in its scope.  Chapter II outlines the 
author’s beliefs about the true challenges facing the broader Middle East today and into 
the foreseeable future.  An effort is made to show the intersection of the key challenges 
that are beginning to play themselves out today but will continue to take front stage by 
the middle of the next decade. 
Up to this point, the issue of demographics has been referred to in grave detail, 
and in Chapter III the issue of demographics will be readdressed.  It is important to note 
here, however, that this thesis transcends demography and uses demography as the 
foundation for further study, not the study in itself. 
Continuing in Chapter III is the notion that this thesis can be viewed like a four 
layered pyramid, with demographics at the base.  Sitting atop demographics is the United 
States as a welfare state.  How did America come to be a welfare state, what are the 
significant changes to the major entitlement programs over the years, and what do future 
projections of these programs look like?  The author realizes that any projections are 
likely to be altered over time, and that entitlement projections should be seen as 
illustrations of the future if no legislative changes or changes in social behavior occur.  In 
other words, the projections contained in this study are only appropriate at this particular 
point in time.  For example, healthcare reform or the delayed retirement of a large portion 
of the baby boom generation will likely alter the projections used here. 
Chapter IV introduces the third layer of the pyramid, the layer that revolves 
around defense spending, and it is here that this thesis separates itself from other work.  
Originally this thesis began with a regression analysis intended to prove that entitlement 
spending in any given year would explain a large portion of the variation in defense 
spending.  This knowledge, if successful, would aid in forecasting future defense outlays 
since future projections have been made about entitlement spending.  Unfortunately the 
regression analysis proved baseless and an alternate method for projecting future defense 
spending was needed.  In the end, the method employed will be used to answer questions 
such as, “to what extent will entitlements and demographics affect the resources available 
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to the Department of Defense (DoD),” and “will these trends force the United States to 
recede from its overseas missions and become a ‘defense of the homeland’ force only?” 
Only after these questions are answered can one draw reasonable implications for 
the DoD and, more broadly, U.S. foreign policy in the future.  A transition is made to the 
top layer of the pyramid – a drawing of conclusions about America’s ability to continue 
projecting a preponderance of power around the globe and, especially, in the Middle East 
in the coming decades. 
Through preliminary research, it was determined that a significant amount of 
information is available on demographics.  There is also a plethora of articles and think 
tank studies on the solvency of America’s entitlement programs.  When it comes to future 
projections for defense spending and, more specifically, the effects of demographics and 
entitlement projections on defense spending, however, the literature is nearly non-
existent.  Additionally, nothing was found linking demographic challenges in America to 
the military’s ability to fulfill its missions and obligations in the Middle East in out years.   
The reason for the small amount of literature on future defense projections and the 
correlation it has with demographics and entitlements is largely due to the fact that 
defense spending is discretionary spending, a term that will be defined later.  As a 
discretionary program, defense spending can go up or down in any given year depending 
on the needs of the President and the approval of Congress.  Because such future 
projections vary widely, it is nearly impossible to project future defense levels with any 
certainty, or at least that is the general consensus.  This thesis will attempt to break that 
mold, and determine a way to forecast future defense spending with some accuracy.  This 
is, of course, no small feat. 
Although this is a large undertaking, it is one that is imperative and whose time is 
due.  With future anticipated budget crunches, senior decision makers in Washington 
should better be able to determine defense outlays.  This will aid in the effort to 
determine future manning levels, monies available for continued research and 
development, monies for operations and maintenance, and even for the ability of the 
United States to wage war on adversaries. 
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The overarching aim of this study is to determine whether the United States is 
positioning itself for all foreseeable and unforeseeable challenges in the coming two-to-
three decades given current demographic, budgetary and political constraints.  Secondary 
and tertiary aims of this study are to highlight the causes of any impediments to U.S. 
supremacy between 2007 and 2030 and the implications of those causes. 
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II. THE MIDDLE EAST – A CONFLUENCE OF ISSUES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 On 6 January 1941, Franklin Roosevelt delivered an inspiring message to 
Congress that invoked passion in both Americans and her allies abroad.  Called the “Four 
Freedoms” speech, Roosevelt proclaimed the freedom of speech and expression, the 
freedom of every person to worship God in his own way, the freedom from want, and the 
freedom from fear…anywhere in the world.  These principles served as the morals, 
ideals, and values that the United States was to employ during a time of Nazi Germany 
occupation over much of the European continent. 
 Almost seventy years later these words still speak to American idealism, but the 
process of spreading freedom is on-going.  In the Middle East, repression, tyranny, and 
authoritarianism still dominate the political landscape.  Freedom House, a non-profit, 
non-partisan organization interested in promoting freedom the world over, conducts an 
annual Freedom in the World survey which measures a country’s political rights and civil 
liberties.  Each country is assigned a numerical rating from 1 to 7, where 1 indicates the 
highest level of freedom and a score of 7 indicates the least amount of freedom.  In its 
2007 edition of the survey, no Middle Eastern country except for Israel was considered 
free.  In fact, only four countries were considered partly free with the rest listed as not 
free.5 
 Since the death of the Prophet Mohammad in 632 AD, the Middle East has served 
as both a civilization worthy of admiration as well as a civilization in decline and decay.  
Unlike the Western experience, the transformation that has overtaken the Middle East is 
one of glory-to-gloom.  Once the envy of the world, the Middle East today suffers from a 
sense of backwardness and underdevelopment. 
 The reasons for this underdevelopment are many, but only three will be 
mentioned here.  First, the effects of globalization have largely been negative in this 
                                                 
5 Freedom House, “Freedom in the World, 2007 Edition,”  
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=366&year=2007 (accessed 11 August 2007). 
 10
region.  Prosperity and progress have been slow and uneven, resulting from both the 
intervention of external forces and the lack of capacity to govern effectively from within.  
A second reason for pause is demographic.  A region that has exhibited a population 
explosion since World War II, from 60 million in 1950 to 265 million in 2005, is now 
entering a stage of crisis.6  The so-called “youth bulge” is expected to worsen by the 
middle of the next decade when this cohort enters their productive work years.  If jobs 
cannot be created for these people, the state may be blamed for its inadequacies.  Finally, 
an Iran that is seemingly growing in influence in the region creates challenges for not 
only the United States but for the other countries in the region. 
 This confluence of issues – globalization, youth bulge, and the rise of Iranian 
influence – poses a significant long-term problem for the United States.  By the middle of 
the next decade, all three issues may dominate the region concurrently, providing a 
breeding ground for dissent not yet realized.  This chapter will attempt to highlight how 
these three issues, beginning to play out this decade, may get worse in the future, causing 
concern among the other nations of the world.  Can the United States continue to provide 
large troop levels and a large financial commitment to the region, or will the challenges 
yet to come cause the United States to reconsider its strong presence in the Middle East? 
B. GLOBALIZATION 
1. Early 1900s to 1980s 
The slow economic development of the Middle East can be attributed to many 
things, but only a few will be noted here.  With the exception of Egypt, which has been 
an autonomous or semi-autonomous state for more than a century, every country in the 
Middle East gained its independence following the dissolution of Ottoman rule after 
World War I.  More than half of the countries in the Middle East gained their 
independence much later than that – after World War II to be exact – from the colonial 
powers of Britain and France.  It was during the brief Western European experience that 
modern institutions were built, but the newly independent countries struggled to adapt to 
                                                 
6 U.S. Census Bureau, “International Database,” http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/ipc/idbagg (accessed 
11 August 2007). 
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the Western models so foreign to them at the time.  This would come to have long term 
unintended consequences, as many of the leaders ruled with an iron fist to maintain their 
legitimacy and hold on power.  
The economic challenges of the post World War II era were the same in the 
Middle East as they were in many other parts of the world.  The onslaught of socialism 
led by the Soviet Union fought against the capitalist mindset established by the West and 
led by the United States.  Although the traditional monarchies of the Arabian peninsula 
tried to distance themselves from this ideological debate, the radical republics of Egypt, 
Iraq and Syria were among those who sided with socialism from the 1940s to 1970s.  
Some key characteristics of this strong interventionist-redistributive model consisted of 
broadly similar economic and social policies that included reliance on state planning in 
determining economic priorities; the adoption of import-substitution industrialization 
policies; the implementation of a wave of agrarian reform programs; sweeping 
nationalizations of private and foreign assets; programs for state provision of education, 
housing, healthcare and food subsidies; and the emergence of centralized, hierarchical 
and tightly controlled trade unions, professional associations and ruling-party 
governments in which the political arena was viewed as an expression of the unity of the 
nation rather than a site of political contestation.7   
The remnants of this period are playing themselves out today.  Corruption 
continues, making the Middle East a poor place to invest.  The prevalence of corruption 
is evident in the “Corruption Perceptions Index” of Transparency International, an 
organization that monitors the business climate in most major countries.8  The index 
scores countries on a scale of one to ten, with one being grossly corrupt and ten being 
clean.  The 2006 Corruption Perceptions Index shows that, with the exception of 
Singapore (5), the top twenty countries are all advanced industrialized countries with 
 
 
                                                 
7 Tarik Yousef, “Development, Growth and Policy Reform in the Middle East and North Africa since 
1950,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 18:3 (2004): 92. 
8 Timur Kuran, “Why the Middle East is Economically Underdeveloped:  Historical Mechanisms of 
Institutional Stagnation,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 18:3 (2004): 87.   
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scores ranging from 7.3 on the low end to 9.6 on the high end.  The Middle Eastern 
countries of Egypt, Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia all scored low with scores ranging from 
1.9 to 3.3. 
The issues surrounding governance in the Middle East were noted in the 2002 
United Nations Arab Human Development Report, which finds that the Middle East is 
anemic in the areas of civil and political freedoms, gender equality, and more generally 
opportunities for the full development of human capabilities and knowledge.  According 
to Robert Looney, to overcome slow development in the Middle East, modern institutions 
such as freely elected legislatures and competent and independent judiciaries and 
institutions that safeguard civil and human rights need to be strengthened.9   
With poor governance, the road to liberalization and into the global economy has 
been daunting for many countries in the Middle East, especially those that lack abundant 
natural resources.  It is to the issue of modern day globalization that this thesis now turns. 
2. 1980s to Present 
Globalization is a nebulous term, poorly defined and believed to mean different 
things to different people in different parts of the world.  It is generally understood in the 
West as an integration of national economies through trade, foreign direct investment, 
and capital flows, but cultural globalization and technological globalization exist as well.  
Although there are many camps on how to define globalization, one thing is very clear – 
there are equally as many camps that support and discredit this phenomenon.  For one, 
globalization is seen as a good thing, a force that has created wealth for many millions of 
people while reducing poverty in many countries.  For another, globalization is the root 
of all evil and a sign of Western economic and cultural imperialism. 
One of the most outspoken people for the benefits of globalization is Jagdish 
Bhagwati.  In his book, titled In Defense of Globalization (2004), he claims as 
“ludicrous” the attempts to knock globalization for inequality and other social ills.  He 
proves that women’s right are advanced by globalization and that child labor practices are 
more heavily scrutinized by globalization, noting that it is abject poverty itself that drives 
                                                 
9 Robert Looney, “Why has the Middle East Been so Slow to Globalize,” Review of Middle East 
Economics and Finance 3:3 (2005): 200. 
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immoral child labor behavior, not globalization.  He concedes that democracy is affected 
by globalization, but in a paradoxical way.  Globalization constrains the exercise of 
sovereignty, and hence the sense and scope of democratic control, since independence 
will imply that an action by one nation-state will generally have consequences that will 
be affected by feedback from other nation-states; at the same time, one can plausibly 
argue that globalization promotes the transition to democracy by regimes that are not 
democratic.10  Open societies such as those found predominantly in the West are 
identifying ways to deal with the challenges that globalization poses for the state.  The 
same cannot be said of the majority of countries in the Middle East who are turning to 
extremist behavior because of this perceived Western onslaught. 
Globalization also has its detractors.  One is Joseph Stiglitz, a well-known and 
respected academic as well as policy maker, who believes that globalization can be a 
good thing if employed correctly.  In his book, Globalization and its Discontents (2002), 
he outlines decisions made by the more powerful countries in the world and international 
organizations such as the World Bank, decisions that have caused harm to the poorest 
people in the more undeveloped countries.  Efforts to privatize public sector industries 
and liberalize financial markets have wreaked havoc on developing countries, he claims.   
The sources of globalization have affected the Middle East in various ways, 
depending on where one looks.  If globalization is an automobile, the countries of the 
Gulf serve as the engine, but oil is also a curse for these resource rich countries.  
Traditionally speaking, the legitimacy of the ruling families was based on religious 
authority, but lately the ability to prop up standards of living through oil revenue 
mobilization has also contributed to the ruling families’ legitimacy.  Most Gulf states use 
oil revenues to provide subsidies, jobs in overstaffed bureaucracies, and inefficient 
enterprises.  When oil prices go south, as they did in the 1980s, the ripple effects of the 
oil bust are felt around the country.  When a government remains in power only because 
of oil money, no fiscal adjustment will be possible unless forced by a crisis.11     
                                                 
10 Jagdish Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 92-93. 
11 Benn Eifert, Alan Gelb, and Nils Borje Tallroth, “Managing Oil Wealth,” Finance and Development 
40:1 (2003). 
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The non-oil rich countries of the Middle East are also deeply affected by 
globalization.  A large portion of these countries’ populations work abroad and send 
remittances back home.  Therefore, they go the way the Gulf countries go.  When times 
are bad, political instability arises because the state is seen as not providing for the 
people.  This was further exacerbated in the 1990s under the auspices of the Washington 
Consensus, the efforts of the U.S. Treasury Department, the International Monetary Fund, 
and the World Bank to liberalize the economies of select countries in Latin America and 
the Middle East.  Eight countries from the Levant and Northern Africa went through 
these structural adjustment programs, designed to grow the economy and spur trade.  To 
that end, social welfare programs were cut, resulting in increased poverty, inequality, and 
unemployment.   
The two Middle Eastern countries in this thesis that underwent such structural 
adjustment, Egypt and Jordan, have met with both success and failure.  They reduced 
inflation and budget deficits, but they failed in other areas intended to lead to sustainable 
development, including improvement in the rate of savings, investment and growth.12  As 
a result, unemployment has risen since the 1980s and the social services no longer being 
provided to the people are a cause of discontent for the people hit hardest by structural 
adjustment.   
There has not been a shortage of groups willing to fill the voids left by the state; 
the Islamist groups providing social welfare are growing in both number and importance, 
appealing to large swaths of the population and creating opportunities for political 
instability.  There is already a growing body of evidence suggesting that economic 
liberalization and other forms of globalization that began in the 1990s have opened up a 
space which is rapidly being occupied by religious groups in the region, some of which 
nurture extremist and violent viewpoints.13 
                                                 
12 Hamed El-Said and Jane Harrigan, “Globalization, International Finance, and Political Islam in the 
Arab World,” The Middle East Journal 60:3 (2006): 456. 
13 Ibid, 459. 
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3. Globalization:  Concluding Remarks 
Globalization has affected different countries in different ways, and this is 
certainly the case in the Middle East.  Whether resource rich or resource poor, 
globalization has had an effect on the legitimacy of the ruling parties and the people 
being governed.  Believed to be an engine that increases the wealth of the people, 
globalization has also created haves and have-nots in the Middle East, with the latter 
being cared for by religious factions filling a void formerly filled by the state.   
C. YOUTH BULGE 
1. Total Fertility Rate Defined 
When determining future population trends, the total fertility rate or TFR is the 
most widely used statistic.  In order for a country to replace its population, it must have a 
TFR that is equal to 2.1 children per woman, on average, between the ages of 14 and 49, 
a woman’s fertile years.  The two represents one child each to replace the mother and the 
father of those two children.  The one-tenth of a child represents the roughly ten percent 
of children that do not reach reproductive age.  Should a country fall below the TFR, it 
must make up the difference through immigration or stand to lose its population over 
time. 
2. Total Fertility Rates in the Middle East 
Only 25 short years ago it was common to find fertility rates throughout the 
Middle East between six and seven children per woman; today, however, that tide has 
definitely turned.  The United Nation’s Population Division now shows the total fertility 
rates for the countries in the Middle East as follows:14 
                                                 
14 United Nations Population Division, “World Population Prospects, the 2006 Revision Database,” 
http://esa.un.org/unpp (accessed 17 July 2007). 
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Figure 1.   Middle East Total Fertility Rates (TFR) 





















































At first, these numbers may be surprising.  In 1980 all countries in the Middle 
East had TFRs between roughly 4.0 and nearly 9.0.  25 short years later, only two 
countries still have TFRs above 4.0 and those two countries, Iraq and Yemen, are 
projected to see their TFRs shrink to near replacement levels by 2030.   
What is causing this decrease in the Middle East?  A bulletin from the Population 
Reference Bureau states “education is the single most important determinant of the 
average age at marriage and age at first birth in the Middle East…because women in the 
region tend to give birth soon after marriage.”15  Education has second and third tier 
effects.  Namely, educated women are more likely to be in search of economic 
opportunity compared to non-educated women.  Also, educated women on average have 
healthier families and are more knowledgeable about birth control options than non-
educated women.  
3. The Youth Bulge Projected 
What is alarming in the Middle East is the youth bulge.  The United Nations 
defines a “youth” as someone between the ages of 15 and 24 and adolescence as those 
between 10 and 19.  The Population Reference Bureau shows that in 2006 the range of 
                                                 
15 Population Reference Bureau, “Transitions in World Population,” Population Bulletin 59:1 (2004). 
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the percentage of youth in each Middle Eastern country was between 20 and 36.16  In 
other words, up to one-third of all Middle Easterners are youth, between the ages of 15 
and 24.  Within a decade, or by about 2015, up to one third of the Middle Eastern 
population will enter adulthood, in search of jobs and the possibility of providing a life 
for themselves and their families.  Years of school, higher learning, and hope will be put 
to the test.  If the state is unable to provide these jobs, it will be the state that the 
disenfranchised will turn their backs on.  This will put a strain on the social fabric and 
create great stresses on the governments in the region. 
4. Youth Bulge:  Concluding Remarks 
The poor prospects for work in the Middle East are currently creating despair and 
lack of hope for a brighter future.  Although most of the people from the Middle East live 
peacefully, some of the more disenfranchised have turned to fanatical causes, joining al-
Qaeda or becoming suicide bombers.  Suicide terrorism is often linked to political Islam, 
but to think the argument stops there is to miss the point.  The thing that fuels these 
barbaric acts, exclusion from the political and economic space, is what needs to be better 
understood.   
If the governments in the Middle East can improve their political capacity and 
extract physical and human resources from their populations, they can climb to 
developing nation status and reap the rewards of sustained economic growth that comes 
with a growing population.  In the short term, however, with the youth bulge about to 
burst, this seems highly unlikely and will create significant challenges within the next ten 
years, challenges that will look similar to the ones being faced today but with more 
people entering the fray.   
                                                 
16 Population Reference Bureau, “Data Finder,” http://www.prb.org/DataFind/datafinder7.htm 
(accessed 17 July 2007).  Data shows the following percentages for youth in each Middle Eastern country:  
Bahrain (24), Egypt (31), Iran (36), Iraq (32), Jordan (31), Kuwait (23), Lebanon (28), Oman (32), Qatar 
(20), Saudi Arabia (30), Syria (34), UAE (24) and Yemen (35). 
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D. GROWING IRANIAN INFLUENCE 
1. Back to Strict Conservatism and Anti-Semitism 
In June 2005, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad won an election run-off against reform-
minded conservative and former President of Iran, Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani.  With this 
election victory, the reform efforts of out-going President Mohammad Khatemi 
effectively ended and Iran has been on a new track ever since. 
 Ahmadinejad has spared no opportunity to lash out at both Israel and the United 
States.  He claims that Israel should be “wiped off the map,” and on a couple of occasions 
he has questioned the veracity of the Holocaust.  His strong words about Israel heading 
toward annihilation have sparked concern from the international community that it might 
be Iran’s intent when it becomes militarily capable. 
2. Nuclear Proliferation  
The National Security Strategy of the United States notes that, “we may face no 
greater challenge from a single country than from Iran.”17  The document refers to Iran 
16 times, as much as both Afghanistan (15) and North Korea (1) combined.  There are 
two alleged reasons for this.  First, Iran’s growing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
program, and second, its growing ability to exert influence in the region.   
 As a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signatory, Iran has agreed to not 
develop a nuclear weapons arsenal.  Iran insists that its current pursuit of nuclear 
technology is for peaceful purposes only and that the country needs nuclear energy to 
meet its electricity generation needs in the future.  At issue here, however, is that the 
Iranian government has not always been forthright with its nuclear program over the 
years, casting doubt and suspicion amongst interested countries.  Suspending inspections 
from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has not helped matters either.  The 
IAEA, despite intensified inspections and other means of investigation since late 2002, 
says it cannot verify that Iran’s program is purely peaceful, and several of its reports (31 
January 2006 and 27 February 2006) say it found documents that show a possible 
                                                 
17 Office of the President of the United States, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America,” http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006 (accessed 27 July 2007). 
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“military nuclear dimension” to Iran’s program.18  At a nuclear energy conference in 
Luxembourg on 24 May 2007, the Chief of the IAEA, Mohammad al-Baradei, stated that 
it was his belief Iran could build a nuclear weapon within “three to eight years,” between 
2010 and 2015. 
 Although Iranian leaders insist on the peaceful use of this technology, many 
critics are not sure.  If Iran did obtain nuclear weapons technology, it could use it to 
bolster its standing in the region, could dominate the Persian Gulf and the Straits of 
Hormuz, could possibly afford to take on a more bellicose foreign policy against the 
United States, and could possibly transfer WMD to extremist groups or countries.  These 
options are not palatable for the United States. 
3. Aspirations for Regional Hegemony 
In addition to Iran’s alleged WMD ambitions, the government of Iran is 
increasing its influence in the region.  By supporting Lebanese Hezbollah and Palestinian 
militant groups, Iran is able to influence policy decisions in the Israeli government and 
stoke fear amongst those in the region who hope to balance Iranian power.   
The State Department’s report on terrorism for 2006, released 30 April 2007, 
states that Iran is the most active state sponsor of terrorism and claims Iran provides 
extensive funding, training, and weapons to Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the al-
Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.19  The 
effectiveness of the weaponry and training being deployed was seen in July – August 
2006, when Israel attacked Southern Lebanon after Hezbollah members abducted two 
Israeli soldiers.  In the 34 days that followed, Israel had a difficult time diminishing the 
ability of the Hezbollah members from waging war against the state, and to many in the 
international community the conflict was seen as a defeat of sorts for Israel, shattering the 
once held notion that the gap between Israel’s military and those of adversaries in the 
region was wide.  Iran is also visible in Iraq today, where American intelligence officials 
                                                 
18 Kenneth Katzman, “Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses,” Congressional Research Service, 
23 January 2007, 15. 
19 U.S. State Department, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2006,” 
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82736.htm (accessed 27 July 2007). 
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have accused the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Iran of providing lethal roadside 
bombs used against American and Iraqi forces.20 
Some academics and policy makers further believe that Iran is positioning itself to 
control the Gulf.  The strength of their influence will come from their Shi’a religion.  A 
leading proponent for this theory is Vali Nasr who claims that the sheer size of the Shi’a 
population today makes them a potentially powerful constituency in the region.  Says 
Nasr, “Shiites account for about 90 percent of Iranians, some 70 percent of the people 
living in the Persian Gulf region, and approximately 50 percent of those in the arc from 
Lebanon to Pakistan – some 140 million people in all.”21  If a democratic Middle East 
comes to fruition and the people vote along religious lines, it is not too far-fetched to see 
a changing of the landscape in the coming years where Shi’as could come to dominate 
politics in the traditionally Sunni dominated Middle East. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The Middle East was once been the envy of the world.  Religious domination over 
a millennium ago led to control of a land mass greater than Alexander’s great conquests.  
There was a time when Edward Said’s Orientalism, a book about how the Occidental 
West viewed the backward Arabs as irrational and menacing, was turned on its head, 
when there were Middle Easterners and then the irrational and menacing Occidentals.  In 
the span of a few centuries, however, the Occidentals reformed their political and 
economic structures and far surpassed the Ottomans.  This trend continues to this day.  
Throughout the 20th century and into the 21st, the Middle East region suffers under the 
weight of repressive regimes where no country, except Israel, is considered free.   
If the three sources of regional instability highlighted above prove to be true, the 
Middle East could be a tinder box for years to come.  The three sources of potential 
instability are globalization, a disenfranchised youth, and growing Iranian influence, and 
all three may converge by the middle of the next decade.  The six non-oil rich countries – 
                                                 
20 Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. Says Iran-Supplied Bomb is Killing More Troops in Iraq,” New York 
Times, 8 August 2007. 
21 Vali Nasr, “When the Shiites Rise,” Foreign Affairs, (2006), 
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060701faessay85405/vali-nasr/when-the-shiites-rise.html (accessed 3 
August 2007). 
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Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen – will continue to find it difficult to 
liberalize their economies while a huge demographic of 20- and 30-somethings seek 
meaningful employment.  As for the eight oil-rich countries bordering the Gulf – 
Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates – 
their populations are also becoming uneasy, citing job opportunities as a primary source 
of concern about their future due to the large number of expatriate workers in the Gulf.22  
If the price of oil recedes sharply in the coming years, the landing could be a hard one 
indeed. 
The confluence of challenges looming on the horizon in the Middle East leads one 
to ask what can be done to allay the fears of the region’s followers.  Will the United 
States be positioned to leverage its resources to maintain stability and order?  This 
pertinent question can now be reviewed in detail in the coming chapters.  This chapter 
served to provide a context for the issues facing the United States in the Middle East in 
the years to come.  This thesis will now turn its attention to the domestic front in an effort 
to determine whether the United States will be able to provide the necessary resources for 
this undertaking.   
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III. DEMOGRAPHY IS DESTINY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
If “demography is destiny” as Auguste Comte, the 19th century French 
mathematician and sociologist, said, the developed countries of today’s world should take 
note of current and future demographic trends and realize that time is not on their side.  In 
the first quarter-to-half of the 21st century, demographic trends could alter the balance of 
power to the extent that today’s developed countries will begin to be challenged by 
today’s developing countries.  This will come about with increases and decreases in 
population and the effects this will have on countries’ economic, political, and military 
structures and potential. 
Throughout human history, the population of the world remained steady, with the 
population exploding in the past 250 hundred years.23  Advances in agricultural 
technology allowed humans to get more from the land they work, and the impact of the 
Industrial Revolution and advances in medicine, public health, and sanitation have 
facilitated aggregate population growth and a demographic shift to cities. 
This phenomenon has had far reaching implications for the advanced 
industrialized societies.  Defined here as the “West,” these countries include those in 
North America, Europe to include Russia, Japan and Australia.  Together, most of these 
countries are entering a phase of human history that has never been seen before.  The 
U.S. Census Bureau reports that for the foreseeable future, Russia’s population will fall at 
a rate of roughly three-quarters of a million people each year.24  Japan’s population 
reached its peak in 2005 and is now beginning to decline.  By 2025, Japan’s population is 
projected to recede by 500 to 700 million persons each year.25  Europe is expected to see 
its population fall from its current 731 million to 715 million by 2025 and approximately 
                                                 
23 U.S. Census Bureau, “Historical Estimates of World Population,” 
http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/worldhis.html (accessed 12 August 2007). 
24 U.S. Census Bureau, “International Database,” http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/ipc/idbsprd (accessed 
12 August 2007). 
25 Ibid. 
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664 million people between the years 2000 to 2050, a total decline of over 65 million 
people by mid century; Germany will contribute to this decline, with the expectation that 
its population will diminish from 82.6 million today to 80.3 million in 2025 and 74.1 
million in 2050.26 
What makes the softening of this fall all the more difficult is the fact that these 
countries are largely social welfare states, providing income and benefits to the aged 
population that is no longer in the workforce.  As the population ages, the strain put on 
the entitlement programs of these various countries could be severe short of reform, with 
implications for other government programs such as defense. 
This chapter will serve as a case study of the United States.  How are 
demographic trends currently underway likely to affect the United States as a welfare 
state and, more broadly, the whole federal budget?  Are the trends that are projected to 
occur in the next two decades sustainable in the long run?  What are the likely costs of 
inaction by the nation’s leaders?   
B. POPULATION GROWTH IN THE UNITED STATES 
1. Introduction 
International relations theorists of the realist tradition believe that population 
gives a country potential to be economically and militarily productive; thus, population 
growth is a key variable in determining a country’s relative power in the international 
system.  Jacek Kugler and Ronald Tammen note that “population is the sine qua non for 
great-power status.  Population provides the potential resource pool from which a nation 
can mobilize and extract resources.  Without a relatively large population, a nation cannot 
hope to become either a great power or a dominant nation [and it] ultimately determines 
the power potential of a nation and is the element that determines which nations will 
remain major powers.”27  Where most developed countries of the world today fall well 
                                                 
26 United Nations Population Division, “World Population Prospects, The 2006 Revision,” 
http://esa.un.org/unpp (accessed 17 July 2007). 
27 Jacek Kugler and Ronald Tammen, “Regional Challenge: China’s Rise to Power,” The Asia-Pacific: 
A Region in Transition (2004): 39. 
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beneath the replacement level, the United States does not.  A summary of American 
population and immigration trends will be provided below. 
2. Population Growth in the United States 
 The TFR of the United States was over seven when the first census was taken in 
1790.  This high figure was similar to that of the Middle East post World War II and 
allowed the young country to grow rapidly as the Middle East is doing today.  It was not 
until the 20th century, however, that the population of the United States grew to make it 
one of the largest countries of the world.  After World War II, the TFR in the United 
States hovered around 3.5.  Although the TFR dipped to just under 1.8 in the 1970s, it has 
since increased to between 2.0 and 2.1, which is where it has held steady since the early 
1990s.28   
 At the turn of the 20th century, the population of the United States was 76 million, 
similar in size to Ethiopia today, the world’s 16th most populous country.29  To put this 
into perspective, one only needs to look at the population of the city of Los Angeles 
between the years 1900 and 2000.  Currently the second largest city in America with a 
population exceeding 3.7 million, Los Angeles had a population of just over 100 
thousand only a century ago.  During the 20th century, the United States would take 50 
years to double its year 1900 size and another almost 50 years to double yet again.  This 
equates to a quadrupling in size in one century as the population began closing in on 300 
million, a mark that would be passed in the second half of 2006.   
                                                 
28 United Nations Population Division, “World Population Prospects, The 2006 Revision,” 
http://esa.un.org/unpp (accessed 17 July 2007). 
29 U.S. Census Bureau, “Historical Tables” and “International Database,” 
http://www.census.gov/statab/hist/02HS0001.xls and http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/ipc/idbrank.pl 
(accessed 17 July 2007). 
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Figure 2.   Population of the United States (in Millions) 
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Source:  From U.S. Census Bureau, “International Data Base,” http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/ipc/idbsprd, 
accessed 6 July 2007. 
 
 During the course of the 1900s, more and more Americans moved to towns and 
cities in search of work and prosperity.  In the year 1900, 50 percent more Americans 
lived in rural areas than in urban areas.  It was not until the 1920s when the tide started to 
turn in favor of the cities, and by the end of the century more than four times as many 
Americans lived in urban areas versus rural areas.  The higher cost of living found in the 
cities, the higher need for educational attainment, and the entrance of women into the 
workforce had profound effects on American life.  For one, men and women delayed the 
age of marriage and pushed back the child rearing years.  The ramifications of this are 
just now being felt. 
3. The Impact of Immigration on Growth in America 
 Since the late 19th century, the United States has benefited greatly from 
immigration.  When a country’s TFR is lower than replacement levels, the only way to 
grow the population is through immigration and no country receives more immigrants 
each year than the United States.  The role of immigrants to America is well documented, 
and immigrants to the United States will continue to propel population figures well into 
the middle of the 21st century, assuming a continuation of current rates. 
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 The origin of immigrants to the United States has changed over the past 100 
years.  During the years 1900 to 1909, more people immigrated to the United States as a 
percentage of the whole population than at any other time in the nation’s history.  Fifty 
percent of the growth of the country during that decade came from abroad, and over 92 
percent of these immigrants came from Europe.  The top three emigrant countries, in 
order, were Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Russia.30  This is drastically different than the 
first seven years of the 21st century.  No longer is Europe the dominant emigrant region to 
the United States, accounting now for just over 15 percent of total migrants to America.  
The countries replacing Europe are, in order, Mexico, India, and China.31   
4. The Aging of the United States 
 The population of the United States is aging.  The baby boom generation, defined 
as those born between 1946 and 1964, are by far the largest generation in America and 
one that is just now approaching retirement age.  For Social Security purposes, a baby 
boomer can retire at the age of 62, albeit with reduced benefits.32  With this in mind, it 
can easily be calculated that those born in 1946 will begin turning 62 years of age in the 
year 2008.  For those born in 1964, normal retirement age will come about in the year 
2030. 
 Due to medical advances and increased access to healthcare among other things, 
people around the world are living longer and to ages unheard of only a hundred years 
ago.  In 1950, only 12 percent of all Americans were aged 60 or older.  By the year 2030, 
when the full weight of the baby boom generation is in retirement that number will be 
double.  Additionally, in 1950 the median age of the American population, the age where 
                                                 
30 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “2006 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics,” 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2006/table02.xls (accessed 7 July 2007).  Note 
Austria-Hungary’s numbers are combined, 532,416 and 685,567 respectively.  Italy emigrated 1,930,475 
people and Russia 1,501,301. 
31 Ibid.  While 7,009,322 people have immigrated to the United States from 2000 through 2006, 
Mexico accounts for 1,208,908 of those people while India and China account for 421,006 and 384,553 
respectively. 
32 Retiring at age 62 represents a 75 percent benefit to a baby boomer born between 1946 and 1954.  
Beginning in 1955 and continuing each year until 1960, normal retirement age increases two months for 
each year until the normal retirement age goes from 66 years old for those born between 1946 to 1954 to 67 
for those born in 1960 and after.  As the normal retirement age increases, reduced benefits for retiring early 
– defined here as age 62 – goes down from a 75 percent benefit to a 70 percent benefit. 
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50 percent of the population is above and 50 percent of the population is below, was 30.  
In 2005 the median age was 36, and the number is projected to grow to 39 by 2030.33  
This upward trend is unprecedented in the nation’s history and will create fiscal problems 
for the foreseeable future. 
5. Population Growth in America:  Concluding Remarks 
 Unlike the other advanced industrialized societies, the United States is projected 
to see population growth well into the 21st century.  With total fertility rates at 
replacement level and more immigrants than any other country in the world, the United 
States is projected to remain the world’s third most populous nation for many years. 
C. ENTITLEMENT SPENDING IN AMERICA – SOCIAL SECURITY 
1. Introduction 
 Social Security is arguably the most popular government program in the United 
States.  For decades it has lifted people out of poverty and given every American a safety 
net during their retirement years.  Nearly every American pays into the system and, thus, 
everyone who lives long enough stands to get something out of it.   
 This section will take a look at how this social welfare program was created and 
why.  It will also bring to light the ways in which the program is increasingly under 
financial stress and the reasons behind this.  Finally, this section will serve as a bridge 
between the demographic trends highlighted in the previous section and the role of 
America as a welfare state between now and 2030. 
  
                                                 
33 United Nations Population Division, “World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision,” 
http://esa.un.org/unpp (accessed 17 July 2007). 
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2. The Role and Evolution of Social Insurance in America 
 When most people think about insurance, they think about private insurance such 
as life insurance, liability insurance, health insurance, and homeowners or renters 
insurance.  These are contracts between an individual and a company to provide some 
kind of security against risk. 
 Social insurance is similar to private insurance in that it provides security against 
catastrophic loss, but the loss that social insurance takes aim at is the risk of poverty due 
to old age.  Without it, many people could not afford to retire or would become burdens 
on their off-spring in order to live.  For insurance to be social, it must have the following 
characteristics: 
• Participation is mandatory or compulsory, 
• It is created by governments, because only governments can mandate 
participation, 
• Financing is compulsory and primarily collected through taxes, 
• Eligibility for benefits is dependent in part on contributions by the individual.34 
 Social insurance had its beginnings in the late 19th century when Otto von 
Bismarck created the first old-age and survivors pension in 1889.  His efforts were 
followed by other European countries but did not take root in the United States until the 
Great Depression.  President Roosevelt, looking to lead the nation through its troubled 
decade, wanted to expand federal social policy using Keynesian economic techniques, 
and he did just that in his New Deal. 
 For the first 15 years Social Security was not wildly popular and certainly not 
among the political right who preferred to abolish it altogether.  Over time, however, it 
grew in popularity to the point that it became a bipartisan issue that would help shape 
domestic politics into the 1960s.  This pay-as-you-go program gained momentum in 1962 
 
 
                                                 
34 Wallace C. Peterson, The Social Security Primer: What Every Citizen Should Know (Armonk: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1999). 
 30
when Medicare was added to the public discourse.  Finally, under President Johnson, 
Medicare and Medicaid (health insurance for the poor) were created in the Social 
Security Act of 1965. 
 Over the years, social insurance has been responsible for improving the lives of 
many Americans.  The accomplishments of the old-age, survivors, and disability 
insurance (OASDI, commonly known as Social Security) are numerous and include the 
following: 
• Without Social Security benefits, 46.8 percent of Americans aged 65 and older 
would have incomes below the poverty line, 
• In 2002, one million children under age 18 were lifted above the poverty line by 
Social Security benefits, 
• In 2002, Social Security provided 50 percent or more of the income of 66 percent 
of elderly people (those age 65 or older).35 
 Past generations of Americans have done their part to make Social Security a 
mainstay in both American politics and the psyche of all retiring Americans.  The system 
has not been reformed since 1983, however, and unless the political establishment of the 
United States can find the political will to overhaul the program in the near future, many 
of the benefits promised to future generations will go unfunded. 
3. Social Security:  Past, Present and Future 
 Since its inception in 1935, Social Security has been one of the three traditional 
legs of retirement for the American family.  In addition to company pensions and private 
investments, Social Security covers a large portion of the retirement income of today’s 
elders.  Due to the demographic changes and aging issues facing America as depicted 






Administration reports, “the worker-to-beneficiary ratio has fallen from 16.5-to-1 in 1950 
to 3.3-to-1 today.”36  By the year 2030, that ratio is projected to diminish even further, to 
2.2-to-1.37 
The purpose of the Social Security program is to provide a specified level of 
monthly income to American retirees.  In 2006, 49 million people received benefits 
totaling $546 billion.38  This makes Social Security the largest government program, 
edging out Defense discretionary spending and Medicare. 
 Income to fund the program is generated from individual taxpayers, their 
employees, and taxes placed on Social Security benefits.  For the former, all American 
employees are required by law to pay 6.2 percent of their payroll taxes to the system.  
Employers are required by law to pay another 6.2 percent to the system.  For sole-
proprietors, the full 12.4 percent burden falls on the company owner.39 
 Social Security has always had sufficient funds to pay benefits to retirees.  In fact, 
more income is currently generated than is being paid out, and the surplus is invested in 
special issue U.S. Treasury securities that have grown to $2 trillion.  As the baby boom 
generation retires between 2008 and 2030, a strain will be placed on this “surplus,” to the 
point that the annual cost of the program will exceed tax revenues beginning in 2017.  In 
other words, the program will take in less than needed, and Social Security will need to 
start using its surplus (Figure 3).  At this point, the program will start by using the interest 
it earns on the trust funds to pay benefits.  Although interest on these assets will continue 
to grow for a few years thereafter, by 2026 the program will be forced to start redeeming 
the bonds in the trust fund to raise the additional funds needed to pay full benefits.  For 
15 years after that point, tax revenues, interest earnings, and proceeds from redeeming the 
Treasury bonds will be sufficient to pay full benefits.   
                                                                                                                                                 
35 Jason Furman, “Top Ten Facts on Social Security’s 70th Anniversary,” Center on Budget and Policy 
Priorities, 11 August 2005, 2-3. 
36 Social Security Administration, “Frequently Asked Questions about Social Security’s Future,” 
http://www.ssa.gov/qa.htm (accessed 17 March 2007). 
37 Social Security Administration, “The 2007 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal 
Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Federal Disability Insurance Trust Funds,” 
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR07 (accessed 17 March 2007), 9. 
38 Ibid, 2. 
39 These taxable amounts only occur on the first $97,500 of income. 
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Figure 3.   OASDI Income and Cost Rates Under Intermediate Assumptions as a 




Source:  From OASDI 2007 Trustees Report.  Available online at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR07.  
 
The Social Security trust fund will be fully exhausted by 2041.  If this occurs, 
which is not likely given popular and political support for Social Security, Generation 
Xers would have substantially lower benefits than the generation that precedes them.  
Barring any changes, Social Security would take in only enough to pay for 75 percent of 
promised benefits, and the income used to pay those benefits will come straight and 
strictly from tax revenues.  This caused the trustees to note in their report that while the 
program passes the short-range test of financial adequacy, it continues to fail the long-
range test (75 years) of actuarial balance by a wide margin. 
Projecting the future outlays of the program requires certain assumptions, both 
demographic, economic, and program specific in nature.  Due to the inherent uncertainty 
created by projecting these types of variables into the future, the trustees have created 
three sets of alternatives, a high, a low, and an intermediate, for their work.  This thesis 
only focuses on the intermediate alternative, which is the best estimate of the Board.  To 
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outline all intermediate assumptions here is beyond the scope of this thesis, but a quick 
synopsis of the broadest and pertinent assumptions is highlighted briefly below: 
• TFR will remain around 2.0 for women aged 14 to 49;  
• Net immigration to the United States will remain around one million per year; 
• Annual increase in productivity is expected to be around 1.7 percent; and 
• Annual increases in the consumer price index (CPI) are assumed to be 1.8 
percent. 
Because projecting the future of Social Security outlays can become nebulous the 
further into the future one goes, the Board’s short-range projections only extend ten 
years, or to 2016.  Figures used for years after 2017 are estimates only.  Analyzing Social 
Security spending as a percentage of GDP during the years in which the baby boom 
generation enters retirement yields the following diagram: 
 



















Note:  Data obtained from Appendix A. 
 
 One can clearly see that over the past decade and a half, Social Security outlays as 
a percentage of GDP have remained relatively steady, at around 4 percent.  The demands 
put on the system by retiring seniors will push that figure up to over 6 percent as a 
percentage of GDP between 2015 and 2030. 
 In an effort to allay fears about the future of Social Security, President Bush 
attempted to make Social Security reform his top domestic agenda item during his second 
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term in office.  His efforts to establish voluntary personal retirement accounts were 
rebuffed by most voters, especially Democrats in Congress.  In the FY2008 budget, the 
President reiterated his position, stating that Social Security would include “voluntary 
personal accounts funded by a portion of the worker’s Social Security payroll taxes.  The 
Budget includes the estimated impact from the creation of such personal accounts.  In 
2012, the first year of the accounts, contributions will be capped at four percent of Social 
Security taxable earnings up to a $1,300 limit, increasing by $100 each year through 
2017.”40  Additionally, the President would like to index to inflation future benefits for 
the highest wage earners while keeping lower-wage workers’ benefits tied to wage 
growth, the current law for all beneficiaries.  But the budget resolution for FY2008 
accepts neither of these proposed reforms. 
4. Social Security:  Concluding Remarks 
In conclusion, older Americans in the past have benefited from Social Security.  
Social Security, however, is a system based on the assumption that future generations 
will outnumber previous generations.  This allows the program to continue to grow in its 
effort to pay benefits to successive generations to come.  Although the program is solvent 
in the short term, there is reason to be concerned about the long term projections.  Future 
generations will continue to benefit from this program but, absent reform, at reduced 
benefit rates. 
There are two primary reasons for this.  First, the baby boom generation that is 
about to enter retirement is expected to place a burden on the system, as a greater number 
of beneficiaries will be supported by a lower number of Americans paying into the 
system.  Second, a bi-partisan effort is necessary to exact change.  The last time this was 
done was in 1983, by a commission led by Alan Greenspan. 
                                                 
40 Office of Management and Budget, “Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2008,” 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2008/pdf/budget/ssa.pdf (accessed 12 August 2007), 144. 
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D. ENTITLEMENT SPENDING IN AMERICA – MEDICARE AND 
MEDICAID 
1. Introduction 
Arguably a larger concern for Americans than solving the issues surrounding 
Social Security is resolving how to curb the runaway costs associated with healthcare.  
Since their inception in the mid-1960s, costs associated with Medicare and Medicaid 
have increased about 2.5 percentage points faster per year than has per capita GDP.41  If 
left unchecked for the following four decades, federal spending for these two programs 
would increase from about 4.5 percent of GDP today to about 20 percent by 2050; that 
amount would represent roughly the same share of the economy as the entire federal 
budget does today.42   
2. Healthcare in the Federal Budget 
For purposes of this thesis, only Medicare and Medicaid will be explored, but by 
no means are these the only two healthcare programs found in the federal budget.  
Medicare, Function 570 of the federal budget, represents healthcare coverage provided to 
elders over the age of 65.  Medicaid, found in Function 550 of the federal budget, differs 
from Medicare in that it is a program funded by the federal government and by states that 
is intended to provide healthcare and health related services to low income individuals. 
 Other functions of the federal budget that provide healthcare coverage include 
Defense, Function 050, and Veterans Benefits, Function 700.  Additionally, a portion of 
salaries and expenses (S&E) of all federal agencies goes toward healthcare insurance of 
federal employees in a program called the Federal Employees Health Benefits plan.  
Healthcare spending in the federal budget for FY2006 is found in Table 1. 
                                                 
41 Congressional Budget Office, “The Long-Term Budget Outlook,” 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdoc.cfm?index=4916&type=0&sequence=0 (accessed 21 June 2007): 6 – 7, 31 – 
32. 
42 From Congressional Budget Office testimony presented to the U.S. Senate Committee on the 
Budget, 21 June 2007. 
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Table 1.   Healthcare Spending in the Federal Budget 
 
Function Outlays in Billions 
  
050:  Defense $38 
550:  Health $263 
570:  Medicare $331 





Source:  From House Concurrent Resolution 95, Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 2006 
 
 Healthcare constitutes a large and growing portion of the federal budget.  Table 1 
shows that, when taken together, total government spending on healthcare in FY2006 was 
nearly $700 billion, over a quarter of the total federal budget.43  The table also shows that 
the two major healthcare entitlement programs of Medicare and Medicaid amount to the 
largest portion of total healthcare spending. 
3. Medicare 
Medicare consists of four parts, Parts A through D.  Part A, otherwise known as 
hospital insurance (HI), covers hospital, home, and hospice care for the elderly.  Parts B 
and D are supplementary medical insurance (SMI) for elderly and disabled who 
voluntarily enroll in the program.  Both Parts B and D are adequately funded for the next 
ten years, but Part A is not.  For this reason, the most attention is needed to “fix” HI.  The 
2007 Trustees Report states that the HI trust fund is projected to be exhausted in 
2019…and that HI tax income is estimated to fall short of HI expenditures in 2007 and is 
projected to do so in all future years (Figure 5).44  
                                                 
43 Office of Management and Budget, “President’s FY08 Budget Request to Congress,” 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy08/pdf/hist.pdf (accessed 12 July 2007): 54.  This document shows 
federal outlays for FY2006 as $2,655.435 billion. 
44 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “The 2007 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees 
of the Federal Hospital Insurance and Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Funds,” Federal 
Hospital Insurance and Supplemental Medical Insurance Board of Trustees, 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/ReportsTrustFunds/downloads/tr2007.pdf (accessed 12 July 2007): 3 – 4. 
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Source:  From Medicare 2007 Trustees Report.  Available online at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/ 
ReportsTrustFunds/downloads/tr2007.pdf.  
  
 Arguably the primary reason for the financial adequacy of SMI versus HI is that 
the two have different trust funds and different sources of revenue.  Whereas SMI 
receives revenues from the Treasury’s general fund as well as monthly premiums from 
beneficiaries, making that portion of the Medicare program fully funded indefinitely, HI 
is funded by employers and employees through a payroll tax equivalent to 1.45 percent of 
wages, or 2.9 percent each.  Sole-proprietors pay the full 2.9 percent of their net income.  
As one can clearly see, as a huge swath of the population enters retirement and begins to 
tap this system, there will be fewer workers to pay the taxes necessary to fully fund and 
support this program.  This, coupled with cost growth relative to GDP growth will make 
the program insolvent in the short term. 
 The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) points out that although an aging 
population is a cause for the growth in healthcare costs, the major factor actually lies with 
the development and increasing use of new medical technology, which has been fueled in 
part by the prevalence of health insurance coverage and has driven up the costs per 
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beneficiary.45  Whereas in most sectors of the economy technology has proven to lower 
costs associated with productivity, in healthcare the reverse is actually true.  The CBO 
states further that widely available health insurance coverage – both public and private – 
means that individual consumers have little incentive to restrict their consumption of 
services, because the price they face is far lower than the cost of providing the service.46    
4. Medicare’s and Medicaid’s Long-Term Economic Impact on the 
Federal Budget 
On March 8, 2007, the CBO provided a report to Congressman Jeb Hensarling in 
response to his inquiry about the state of America’s entitlement programs and the effects 
of the future growth of these programs on the economy.  The CBO indicated that both 
Medicare and Medicaid have consumed a growing share of the budget in recent decades, 
and that the aging of the population and increased healthcare costs are the primary 
drivers, with the latter being the real catalyst.  These increased healthcare costs create 
questions of economic sustainability.  The CBO argues that on its current trajectory, the 
federal debt will grow substantially, creating significant budget deficits that reduce 
national saving, slow private capital formation, lower economic growth, and possibly 
produce a sustained economic contraction.47     
On June 18, 2007, the ranking member of the Senate’s Committee on the Budget, 
Senator Judd Gregg, asked the CBO to assess the potential economic effects of using 
higher tax rates to finance the projected increases in entitlement spending over the next 
several decades.  In the CBO’s response, presented to Senator Gregg on July 9, 2007, a 
model was created to determine what marginal tax rates would have to be raised to in an 
effort to keep up with the projected increased costs of Medicare.  The answer lies in 
substantial marginal tax increases, so much so that the 10 percent tax rate, the lowest 
under the current tax code, would have to be increased to 26 percent, and the highest 
                                                 
45 Congressional Budget Office, “The Long-Term Budget Outlook,” 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdoc.cfm?index=4916&type=0&sequence=0 (accessed 10 July 2007): 6. 
46 Ibid, 6. 
47 Congressional Budget Office letter to Congressman Jeb Hensarling, 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/78xx/doc7851/03-08-Long-Term%20Spending.pdf (accessed 17 August 
2007). 
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current tax rate would have to be increased from 35 percent to 92 percent.  The 
macroeconomic effects of this are significant.  Tax avoidance and evasion would likely 
increase, and revenues could fall significantly short of the amount needed to finance the 
growth of spending.48 
 As with Social Security, the Board of Trustees conducts annual projections using 
low, intermediate, and high assumptions.  For purposes of illustration, only the 
intermediate assumptions are used in this thesis. 
 Pictorially, one can see the increases in entitlement spending that are projected to 
occur in the coming two decades.  Figure 6 combines the three entitlement programs 
discussed here in an effort to show how they will grow over time. 
 
Figure 6.   Entitlements as a Percentage of GDP  
 





































Figure 6 depicts three primary things.  First, a 2 percent increase in spending for 
entitlements as a share of GDP has occurred in the past 15 years.  Second, with the 
advent of the baby boom generation approaching retirement, entitlements are projected to 
increase by nearly 10 percent of GDP by the time all baby boomers are of retirement age.  
And third, although both Social Security and Medicaid outlays are due to grow, it is the 
rapid rise of Medicare costs that will push it to become the largest entitlement program 
by the end of this period. 
                                                 
48 Congressional Budget Office letter delivered to Senator Judd Gregg, U.S. Senate Committee on the 
Budget, http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/82xx/doc8295/07-09-Financing_Spending.pdf (accessed 10 July 
2007). 
Actual         Projected 
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5. Healthcare:  Concluding Remarks 
 Medical coverage for Americans allows them to live longer and more fulfilling 
lives.  Since their inception in the mid-1960s, however, Medicare and Medicaid have 
grown in size and are already the single largest burden to the federal budget as the baby 
boomers enter retirement.  Short of meaningful healthcare reform it is entirely feasible 
that the whole federal budget could one day go to pay for the two major entitlement 
programs.   
E. CONCLUSION 
 This chapter attempted to do two things.  First, it attempted to highlight the 
demographic situation of the United States.  Birth rates continue to be at replacement 
level, but thanks to immigration the country’s population is projected to grow well into 
the future.  This bodes well for the country’s ability to grow economically, redistribute 
wealth, and fund key government programs. 
 This chapter also attempted to shed light on the growing concerns revolving 
around America’s major entitlement programs.  These popular programs are difficult to 
change politically, but the United States finds itself at a crossroads where change is 
paramount.  Spiraling costs in future years coupled with diminishing trust funds will put 
each of the programs at financial risk.  Even of broader importance, the economy of the 
United States will hang in the balance without reform, especially as it pertains to 
healthcare.  Alternative ways for resolving the nation’s long-term budget problems carry 
different implications for the economy, but those economic differences pale in 
comparison to the economic costs the nation would face in the long run if federal debts 
were allowed to grow faster than the economy for an extended period of time. The CBO 
states that “if the budget was on a sustainable track, real GDP could more than double 
between now and 2050…failing to achieve fiscal sustainability, however, could put the 
long-run growth of the economy at risk.49 
                                                 
49 Congressional Budget Office letter delivered to Senator Judd Gregg, U.S. Senate Committee on the 
Budget, http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/82xx/doc8295/07-09-Financing_Spending.pdf (accessed 10 July 
2007). 
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 The issue of entitlement reform is so important in the eyes of David Walker, the 
nation’s comptroller general at the Government Accountability Office, that he is currently 
on a road tour with members of the liberal Brookings Institute and conservative Heritage 
Foundation to generate interest among Americans to make this a voting issue in the 2008 
primary and general elections.  The message being conveyed is very clear – the current 
fiscal policy is unsustainable in the long-term.50   
 At this point we have established a working knowledge of the key components of 
the federal budget that represent the mandatory, or non-discretionary, portions of the 
budget.  Mandatory programs are funded by eligibility rules and payment rules.  
Congress does not increase or decrease the budget expenditures for these programs.  
Instead, what Congress can do is change the eligibility rules to include or exclude more 
people, adjust payments to medical providers, and adjust premium rates for beneficiaries. 
 This thesis will now introduce the defense budget, the largest discretionary 
component of the federal budget.  Combining future projections in defense spending with 
the future projections for the entitlement programs will be key to determining whether or 
not the United States will continue to be able to maintain its status as the world’s sole 
superpower and be able to fulfill its missions and obligations around the globe, especially 
as they pertain to the Middle East. 
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IV. ABILITY TO DEFEND THE NATIONAL INTEREST 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 The first sentence in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) states, “the 
United States is a nation engaged in what will be a long war.”51  The document serves as 
a report of ideas and proposals for force modernization and transformation in the coming 
years as the United States positions itself for 21st century challenges.  This most recent 
QDR revolved more heavily around capabilities than it did numbers, and it spoke of the 
pressing need for the United States military to become a lighter, more agile, and more 
deployable force.  Agreeing with the sentiments of the QDR’s signatory, Donald 
Rumsfeld, the Heritage Foundation said that “with the stakes no less than survival of the 
free world, leadership by the United States is essential to winning the ‘long war’ now 
raging against forces of Islamic fascism.”52 
 The so-called “long war” may be here to stay and may be the greatest challenge 
the United States faces in the first half of the 21st century, but war as seen in the 20th 
century may be a thing of the past.  The number of major armed conflicts has declined 
steadily since 1999, and the figure for 2005 is the lowest for the entire post Col War 
period 1990 – 2005.53  As a result of economic prosperity, free elections, stable central 
governments, better communication, more “peacemaking institutions,” and increased 
international engagement, the world has gone through a steady, nearly uninterrupted 
decline in wars and conflict since 1991.54  Indeed, the number of armed conflicts around 
 
 
                                                 
51 U.S. Defense Department, “Quadrennial Defense Review Report,” 
http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf (6 February 2006): v. 
52 Baker Spring, “Defense Spending,” The Heritage Foundation, 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/features/issues/issuearea/Defense.cfm (accessed 11 July 2007). 
53 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2006: Armaments, Disarmament 
and International Security (Oxford University Press, 2006): 108. 
54 Gregg Easterbrook, “Explaining 15 Years of Diminishing Violence,” The New Republic, 30 May 
2005.  The article points to the fact that there were 51 wars and armed conflicts in 1991 but only 20 by 
2004. 
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the world has declined by more than 40 percent since the early 1990s, and between 1991 
and 2004, 28 armed struggles for self-determination started and restarted, while 43 were 
contained or ended.55 
Notwithstanding these trends, the United States remains at war in Afghanistan and 
Iraq.  Determining whether the political will and resources will be available for the 
military to effectively wage this War on Terror is difficult.  This chapter will attempt to 
frame the future of U.S. defense spending given the pending demographic changes in the 
United States and the impact of these demographic changes on entitlement spending.  
One could conclude that if entitlement spending continues unchecked, the strain on the 
federal budget would be so severe as to cut into defense spending.  This would erode the 
Defense Department’s ability to prosecute the long war. 
B. DISCRETIONARY SPENDING 
1. Introduction 
Discretionary spending refers to spending provided through annual appropriation 
bills passed by the Congress.  It is in contrast to entitlement spending, which is provided 
through permanent appropriation.  This means that the budget process displays a bias 
toward entitlement programs, with the result being “that entitlement spending is subject 
to continuous aggregation, while discretionary spending is subject to continuous 
negotiation.”56   
 Defense spending is not the only category of discretionary spending in the federal 
budget, but it is the largest.  Other programs that fall under the discretionary portion of 
the budget include, but are not limited to, maintenance of national parks, education, 
transportation, veteran’s benefits, and monies for international affairs and foreign aid.  
All categories of discretionary spending that are not defense-related are referred to as 
“non-defense discretionary” spending. 
                                                 
55 Human Security Centre, “The Human Security Report,” 
http://www.humansecurityreport.info/content/view/28/63 (accessed 17 August 2007): 1. 
56 Richard Doyle, “Congress, the Deficit, and Budget Reconciliation,” Public Budgeting and Finance, 
(1996): 72. 
 45
 Before Medicare and Medicaid were enacted in the mid-1960s, discretionary 
spending constituted the largest portion of the federal budget, but beginning in the mid-
1960s that edge has disappeared (see Figure 7).  For most of the past several decades, 
non-defense discretionary spending amounted to between 3 and 4 percent of GDP.57  
Defense, on the other hand, has fluctuated as a result of Cold War build-ups and the 
Vietnam War.  Since 1965, defense discretionary spending has amounted to somewhere 
between a low of 3 percent in the three years preceding 9/11 to 9.4 percent in 1968, when 
the costs of the Vietnam War were added to the defense budget.58  As a result, the 
discretionary portion of the federal budget typically goes the way defense spending goes. 
 
Figure 7.   Composition of Federal Spending 
 
 
Source:  From Government Accountability Office, DoD Transformation: Challenges and Opportunities, 12 
February 2007. 
 
 After 9/11, a premium has been placed on national security, thus the creation of 
the Department of Homeland Security and an increasing defense budget.  In fact, the 
amount that the United States spends on defense is nearly as great as defense spending 
for the rest of the world.  The SIPRI Yearbook for 2006 states that “the 15 countries that 
                                                 
57 Congressional Budget Office, “The Long-Term Budget Outlook,” 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdoc.cfm?index=4916&type=0&sequence=0 (accessed 12 July 2007): 39. 
58 Ibid, 37. 
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spent most on their military forces in 2005…account for 84 percent of all world 
spending…and the United States, with its 48 percent of world military expenditure, 
stands out even among the major spenders.”59  But just as there can be increases in 
defense spending, there can also be decreases in defense spending as seen after the Cold 
War ended; in fact, this has been the general trend since World War II.  The fluctuations 
are based on geopolitical events – primarily wars – that make it quite difficult to project 
defense spending more than just a couple of years into the future. 
 
Figure 8.   Defense Spending as a Percentage of GDP 
 





























































Source:  From FY2008 President’s Budget Submission to Congress, Historical Tables, Table 3.1, Outlays 
by Superfunction and Function, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy08/pdf/hist.pdf, accessed 12 July 
2007. 
 
 Although defense discretionary spending was as low as 3 percent, this number 
must be put in context.  When the Cold War ended at the end of the 1980s to early 1990s, 
with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Clinton 
Administration and Congress made deep defense cuts to reduce excess deemed no longer 
necessary.  Twelve of 24 air wings were closed, eight of 18 army divisions were cut, and 
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and International Security (Oxford University Press, 2006): 300. 
Vietnam 
 
          Reagan Build-Up 





                                              Post Cold War Drawdown 
 47
troop levels were reduced.60  A new day had dawned, and it was no longer believed that 
the United States needed to maintain forces of the same magnitude that it had in years 
past. 
2. 9/11 Implications for Defense Outlays 
Although the 2000 defense budget increased in size from the earlier drawdown 
years, it was the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, D.C. on 9/11 that served 
as the catalyst for the recent major and prolonged growth in defense budgets.  The 
George W. Bush Administration took the position that terrorism must be defeated, and 
Congress supported his requests for larger defense budgets.  In 2002, defense outlays rose 
by 14 percent – to 3.4 percent of GDP – because of operations in Afghanistan, other 
activities related to the war on terrorism, and defense initiatives that had been planned or 
funded before the attacks of September 11, 2001.61  This number continued to climb after 
the U.S. invaded Iraq in March 2003.  After annual increases in outlays of 16 percent in 
2003 and 12 percent in 2004, growth in defense outlays slowed to 9 percent in 2005 and 
to 5 percent in 2006; however, once additional appropriations are enacted to finance 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, defense outlays are likely to be close to $560 billion – 
or 4.1 percent of GDP – in 2007.62  As for non-defense discretionary spending, the 
FY2007 appropriation bills for these various programs are expected to be $471 billion 
and projected to grow with the economy over the coming decade.  This would equate to a 
2 percent increase per year from now to 2017.63 
 Leading up to the war in Iraq, the administration was hesitant to release estimates 
about the costs of going to war in Iraq, and the timing was such that Congress did not 
push the issue during the first years of the conflict.  Defense Secretary Rumsfeld argued 
that estimating war costs is too difficult, requiring one to predict the outcome of some six 
to eight variables correctly just to come up with a figure.  He did concede that the war 
                                                 
60 Steven Kosiak, “Analysis of the FY2007 Defense Budget Request,” Center for Strategic and 
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would cost under $50 billion, but one of President Bush’s economic advisors at the time, 
Larry Lindsay, projected that the war would cost between $100 billion and $200 billion.64  
This angered some government officials and shortly thereafter Mr. Lindsay resigned from 
his position. 
 As with almost all wars that preceded the War on Terror, this war was financed in 
its early stages using supplemental monies approved by Congress.  The defense budget, 
as outlined above, is an annually planned part of the federal budget whose primary 
purpose is to pay for force structure and military readiness, not wartime obligations.  
Supplemental funds are provided in the early stages of war to cover combat costs. 
 What separates the Global War on Terror from previous wars is the policy that the 
administration has used to fund it.  Whereas in past wars, like Vietnam, for example, 
where supplemental monies were used in the early going, those wars were funded in the 
regular defense budget in subsequent years.  This has almost always been accompanied 
by an increase in taxes to cover the costs of war as well as maintain the ability to cover 
the costs of other government expenditures.  However, the Bush Administration has not 
asked Congress for a tax increase since coming to office in 2001; rather, it has 
successfully pushed through tax cuts, which means that covering the costs of war will be 
paid by borrowing.  The large supplemental bills that have passed each year since major 
operations broke out have come at the expense of conservative fiscal policy.  Budget 
surpluses became budget deficits, and the public debt has increased dramatically. 
 A Congressional Research Service report for Congress highlights the enormity of 
the costs of the War on Terror.  It notes that with the enactment of the FY2007 
supplemental on 25 May 2007, Congress has approved a total of about $610 billion for 
military operations, base security, reconstruction, foreign aid, embassy costs, and 
veteran’s healthcare for the three operations initiated since the 9/11 attacks:  Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF) Afghanistan and other counter terror operations; Operation 
Noble Eagle (ONE), providing enhanced security at military bases; and Operation Iraqi 
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Freedom (OIF).65  Of this amount, approximately three-quarters has gone to OIF, with 
the remaining 25 percent funding OEF and enhanced base security in the region. 
 Because many in Congress objected to the lack of apparent transparency in the 
administration’s defense budget requests over the past few years, the administration 
submitted a budget proposal for FY2008 that includes its estimates on what war costs will 
be in that year.  The baseline FY2008 budget calls for a defense budget of $481 billion.  
Additionally, the DoD submitted a separate emergency request of $141.7 billion to cover 
war costs. 
 Determining what the future holds in terms of troop presence and total cost of 
combat is a difficult activity, but in February 2007 the CBO provided Congress with two 
possible scenarios.  The first, and more ambitious scenario, assumed that deployed troops 
would be reduced to 30,000 by 2010.  The second scenario assumed that deployed troops 
would gradually be reduced to 75,000 by the year 2013.  Under the first scenario, the 
estimated additional costs of U.S. activities in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the War on 
Terrorism totaled $472 billion in budget authority between 2007 and 2017.  Under the 
second scenario, the estimated additional costs for executing the War on Terror in Iraq 
and Afghanistan totaled $919 billion.66  If these numbers prove accurate, that would 
bring the cost of the War on Terror to somewhere between $1 trillion and $1.5 trillion by 
midway through the next decade.   
3. Discretionary Spending:  Concluding Remarks 
The discretionary portion of the federal budget is provided in annual 
appropriations acts, which includes spending for the Defense Department.  Before 1974, 
discretionary spending was the predominant part of the budget and the one that gave the 
Congress the greatest amount of legislative discretion.  With the increasing costs of 
entitlements, discretionary spending has become an increasingly smaller part of the total 
federal budget.  This has had far reaching consequences that are just now being realized. 
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Monies allocated to defense spending have been increased after 9/11 because of 
the paramount importance of providing for the nation’s defense.  The increase has 
brought defense spending from its all-time low of 3.0 percent of GDP to just over 4.0 
percent of GDP, not including the supplemental monies that have continued to fund 
major combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  If the President continues to demand 
and the Congress to fund the prosecution of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq without 
increasing taxes or decreasing spending elsewhere, the total amount of debt the 
government and the American people will incur in out years could very easily top a 
trillion dollars.  
C. CHALLENGES FACING THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT 
1. Introduction 
In order to fight and win tomorrow’s wars, the United States currently finds itself 
having to prepare for both a conventional and an asymmetric threat.  This means 
preparing for both state-on-state warfare as well as warfare against non-state actors.  
Protecting Americans and American interests from terrorist activities, long-range ballistic 
missiles, and potentially both space and cyber warfare is a daunting task. 
2. Rising Cost of Personnel and Equipment 
Efficiency in how the Defense Department carries out its tasks will prove vital to 
the success of its future.  The major appropriation titles in the defense budget are military 
personnel, operations and maintenance (O&M), procurement, and research and 
development.  Rising costs for personnel as well as cost overruns for major weapons 
systems are making it difficult for the Defense Department to prosecute the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan while also maintaining readiness at acceptable levels and continue 
defense transformation. 
 Between now and the foreseeable future, personnel costs are likely to rise.  The 
two primary reasons for this are the growing costs associated with fielding a military 
member as well as the plus-ups in the size of the active-duty Army and the Marine Corps.  
Comparing the FY2000 defense budget with the FY2006 defense budget shows an 
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increase of approximately $77 billion, almost 60 percent of which goes to military 
personnel and O&M.  Much of this money has been used to improve the extent and 
quality of military training, to ensure that the quality of life in the military keeps up with 
the quality of life in the civilian sector, and to cover the increased costs for healthcare for 
military members and their families.67  The Congressional Budget Office projects that the 
cost of increasing the active-duty Army by 65,000 and the Marine Corps by 27,000 
personnel will be about $108 billion over the 2007 – 2013 period, as compared to the 
force levels recommended in the QDR.68 
 In addition to the increased costs of fielding a larger military, there are the 
increased costs of today’s weapon systems and the acquisition of future hardware.  The 
Joint Strike Fighter, space launch systems, and the Army Future Combat System are all 
examples of projects that are experiencing cost overruns, but ship building and the F/A-
22 are perhaps the most discussed programs.   
If life expectancy for a naval ship is 35 years, and the Navy would like to have a 
fleet of 300 vessels, then it should strive to average between eight and nine ships to be 
built per year.  That has not been the case lately, jeopardizing the fleet in the long-term.  
In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 10, 2005, the 
outgoing Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Vernon Clark, said that costs of the major 
types of ships had grown by as much as 400 percent beyond inflation over the past thirty 
years, that greater capabilities explain only part of the increase, that so few ships are 
being built that overhead costs are spread too narrowly, and that the Navy cannot afford 
more than 250 ships in the long run unless costs are brought under control.69   
The Air Force has also struggled, especially with regard to its F/A-22 Raptor.  
Designed in the 1980s to replace an aging F-15 fleet, the Air Force originally intended to 
purchase 700 of these aircraft.  Due to timeline delays, the Bottom-Up Review after the 
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Cold War, and years of increased program costs, the Air Force found itself in a position 
to only receive a portion of the originally planned amount.  As production cuts and 
further unit cost increases pushed the price of the aircraft up to over $300 million per 
aircraft in FY2006 dollars, the Defense Department, against the wishes of the Air Force, 
decided to halt production after building about 180 planes.70   
3. Defense Department Challenges:  Concluding Remarks 
 Maintaining a military force that retains a technological advantage is expensive.  
Transitioning to a modern, futuristic military capable of winning tomorrow’s wars while 
maintaining the current force levels and fighting the GWOT will prove to be challenging, 
both from a management and fiscal perspective.  The cost per military member has 
increased over the years, and cost overruns in the acquisition of new, major weapons 
systems are making it difficult to field the new equipment in the quantities needed with 
the resources allocated. 
D. PROJECTING THE FUTURE OF DEFENSE SPENDING 
1. Introduction 
In order to determine whether defense monies will be adequate in future years, 
assumptions must be made about the future.  As with any projections, the assumptions are 
critical. 
 For the purposes of this thesis, three different scenarios were run using defense 
spending as a percentage of GDP.  As seen in Figure 4 on a previous page, defense 
spending as a percentage of GDP has fluctuated over time, but it has never dipped below 
3 percent.  Also, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have, until FY2008, been funded using 
supplemental dollars and thus have technically not been added to the defense budget.  If 
the costs of these two wars were added to the defense appropriation bill, defense budgets 
over the past few years would have exceeded $600 billion per year.  As it is, defense 
spending as a percentage of GDP has grown to just over 4 percent.  It is assumed here 
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that defense spending will stay between 3 and 4 percent of GDP into the foreseeable 
future.  At 3 percent, the Defense Department will barely be able to fund new major 
weapons systems and increased personnel.  At 4 percent those challenges still exist but 
enough leverage is granted to continue with current operations and maintenance of the 
force. 
2. Future Defense Projections 
Projecting defense outlays is an inexact science, but it is necessary if one wants to 
draw conclusions about the effects that entitlement spending will have on defense 
spending in the future.  Taking information from the 2007 Office of the Secretary of 
Defense – Comptroller “Greenbook” for years 1990 to 2006, and assuming future 
spending at 3 percent, 3.5 percent, and 4 percent of GDP for years 2007 to 2030, shows 
the following: 
 
Figure 9.   Projected Defense Spending to 2030, (Constant 2005 Dollars) 
 
























































Note:  Data can be found in Appendix D. 
 
 Figure 9 shows the cost of maintaining the military over time.  If the United States 
stays on a trajectory of 4 percent of GDP for defense outlays, it will cost more than $4.3 
Actual  Projected 
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trillion over the 3 percent of GDP amount between 2007 and 2030.71  This chart should 
not surprise anyone.  Although the 4 percent figure for 2030 is a very large $973 billion 
in constant 2005 dollars, about twice as much as today’s defense budget, the GDP in 
2030 is estimated at over $24 trillion, nearly twice as much as it is today.  If the 
American economy is able to sustain this modest growth over time, it can be argued that 
the defense budget may keep pace with the growth in the economy. 
 It should also be noted at this time that the above figure does not coincide with 
projections being made by the Defense Department or the administration.  Both project 
defense spending, in absolute terms, to decline between now and 2012.72  The Center for 
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), an independent and non-partisan policy 
research institute, claims that lower defense budgets are unlikely to prove sufficient to 
pay for DoD’s long-term force structure, modernization and readiness plans, and that 
fully implementing DoD’s plans, over the long-term, could require increasing funding for 
defense by an additional $75 billion or more per year beyond the levels called for in the 
administration’s current plan.73   
 At this point the question to ask is whether the United States will be able to fund a 
military using 3 to 4 percent of GDP in the out years given the growth in spending for 
entitlement programs.  It is to that point that this paper now turns. 
3. Modeling the Future of Entitlements and Defense Spending 
 At this point one has enough information to begin drawing conclusions about the 
future of the federal budget, especially as it pertains to projected entitlement spending 
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and projected defense spending.  Before beginning this discussion, however, it is quite 
important to preface any future modeling with a summary of federal spending as a 
percentage of GDP. 
 Excluding the World War II years when public spending skyrocketed past 40 
percent of GDP, the United States has, by-and-large, kept public spending around 20 
percent of GDP.  During the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations, public 
spending crept beyond 20 percent of GDP, but never was public spending higher than 23 
percent (1982 and 1983), and never was spending lower than 17 percent (1966).  In fact, 
from 1966 to 2006, the average amount of federal spending as a percentage of GDP has 
been right at 20 percent. 
 How high can federal spending go before it is unsustainable?  There is no magic 
number to be given here, but it is widely believed and common sensical that spending 
should not significantly and persistently exceed revenues.  If it does, deficits will prove a 
strain to the economy.  Thus, as long as a country is able to adequately fund its programs 
and service its debt, spending theoretically could go significantly higher than 20 percent. 
 The economy of the United States, the economy is projected to grow in the future, 
albeit at a rate between 2.5 and 3 percent per year.74  The baseline for most analysts who 
project the future remains the same however; 20 percent of GDP is the most widely used 
statistic when determining the appropriate levels of federal spending.  With this in mind, 
this thesis revisits Figure 10 from the previous chapter and is able to overlay the 
historical federal spending amounts onto the graph to produce the following. 
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Figure 10.   Impact of Mandatory Programs on Federal Spending  
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GDP
Gov't Receipts as a % of
GDP
 
The green line represents tax generated revenue that the government receives 
primarily from individuals and corporations.  The red line represents total government 
spending.  Periods in which the green line is below the red line represents a year of deficit 
spending, whereas periods in which the red line is below the green line represents a year 
of a surplus.  Deficit spending requires the government to issue debt to cover its 
expenses. 
4. Future Projections:  Concluding Remarks 
One can easily discern from the above graph that if entitlement reform does not 
take place in the near future, the entitlement spending portion of the federal budget could 
one day consume all federal revenues.  The chart shows entitlement spending on an 
upward trend, passing 17 percent of GDP by 2030.  Whether the defense budget stays 
between 3 to 4 percent of GDP or goes below that figure (or above) is irrelevant if 
entitlement spending continues on its current path.  Joining the projected defense figures 
of 3 to 4 percent of GDP with other government spending, and it is clear that there should 
be cause for concern in the defense establishment in future years, beginning in the very 
near future because entitlement spending will balloon to levels unprecedented in the 
Actual          Projected 
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nation’s history.  If federal spending continues on its current path, it is quite possible that 
by 2030, federal spending may fall between 25 and 30 percent of GDP.  If government 
receipts do not increase in the coming years to help off-set these costs, massive 
borrowing will ensue, pushing debt and the interest on the nation’s debt ever higher. 
E. POSSIBLE SOURCES FOR FILLING A VOID 
 Armed with the knowledge that future federal spending trends could potentially 
limit military operations, it is prudent to search for alternative means by which to 
implement policy goals in the Middle Eastern region.  As seen in both Afghanistan and 
Iraq, multilateral efforts are necessary for the United States in the region.  If certain 
trends continue to hold in the coming decades, however, it will be increasingly difficult 
for the United States to rely on traditional military allies from Western Europe.  Most 
countries in Europe today are facing their own demographic crisis and at a level that 
makes the current issues in the United States seem to pale in comparison. 
 In addition to the traditional allies of Western Europe, the United States works 
with other countries on matters of common interest.  Many countries have joined U.S.-led 
operations since the Cold War and have shown a willingness to strengthen ties with the 
United States in the years since.  At the forefront of this effort are countries like Australia 
and New Zealand, Japan and South Korea, and the countries from Central and Eastern 
Europe that joined the NATO alliance in 1997 (Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) 
and 2004 (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia).  
Additionally, there are 23 Partnership-for-Peace nations, as well as seven Mediterranean 
Dialogue and six Istanbul Cooperation Initiative countries from Central Asia, Northern 
Africa and the Middle East working toward better relations with NATO member states. 
1. The Ability of Allies to Contribute to the Common Defense 
Between the end of World War II and the end of the Cold War, many Western 
European countries enjoyed the security provided by the United States against Soviet 
expansion and the threat of a nuclear attack.  The financial priority was economic 
recovery and growth.  With Europe relatively secure, the countries focused their efforts 
on providing social welfare benefits to an aging population.  As a result, defense outlays 
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have decreased, as seen in defense spending as a percentage of GDP in the larger Western 
European states of Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain.  In the late 1980s, at the 
end of the Cold War, the percentage of the economy being spent by these countries on 
defense ranged between 2 and 4.5 percent.  In the years since the Cold War ended, 
defense expenditures there have dwindled, and are between 1 and 2.5 percent in 2006.75   
If one looks even further into the data, it will reveal that a growing portion of 
these countries’ defense budgets is being spent on personnel at the expense of equipment 
and modernization.  With the exception of Britain, the other four countries are spending 
anywhere between half to just over three-fourths of defense expenditures on personnel.76  
Since the number of military members in absolute terms has stayed flat or has 
decreased,77 one can only assume that the increase in personnel expenses is the result of 
legacy costs. 
In 2005, the only region of the world with a decrease in military expenditure was 
Europe, with a 1.7 percent decrease.78  The level of Central European military 
expenditure did not change, while in Eastern Europe it increased by 8.9 percent, largely 
because of Russia’s increases in defense spending; but, as West European military 
spending accounts for about 86 percent of total European spending, the result is still a 
tangible decrease for the whole region.79   
Of the seven countries of Eastern Europe that joined the NATO alliance in 2004, 
six of them have increased defense expenditures since joining the alliance, Slovakia 
being the lone exception.  Due to the small size of their economies, defense spending in 
real terms is quite small.  Only two of the seven, Bulgaria and Romania, spend more than 
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2 percent of GDP on defense.  Additionally, all seven of these NATO countries were 
recipients of U.S. military assistance in 2005, assistance totaling over $51 million.80   
The same trend found in the 2004 NATO group can also be found when analyzing 
the three European countries that received NATO member status in 1999.  The Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Poland have all increased defense expenditures since 1999, but 
all three spend a small amount on defense, with Poland the highest country at 2 percent.81  
Additionally, all three countries receive military assistance from the United States.  In 
2005, total military assistance to these states amounted to nearly $95 million, with 80 
percent of that amount going to Poland.82 
The U.S. Defense Department produces an annual report titled Allied 
Contributions to the Common Defense, covering allied contributions made during a given 
calendar year.  This report considers countries in the NATO alliance before enlargement 
in 1999; Pacific allies Australia, Japan, and Republic of Korea; and Gulf Cooperation 
Council allies Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab 
Emirates.  The 2004 version of this document provides a clear picture of defense 
spending. 
Data from in the Allied Contributions publication are used to assess a country’s 
contribution relative to its ability to contribute.  The analysis is conducted in three stages: 
• A country’s contribution expressed as a share of the total contributions of all 
nations; 
• A country’s ability to contribute expressed as a share of the total of all nations; 
and 
• A ratio of the share of contribution divided by the share of ability to contribute.83 
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This last point suggests the concept of equity of a nation’s efforts.  Although no baseline 
is given in the publication, the average ratio among the 27 countries is 1.38 and falls 
between the ninth and tenth country on the list.  The top ten countries in terms of this 
ratio are shown in Table 2. 
 






Ratio of Defense Spending 
2003 Share / GDP Share 
   
1 Oman 4.65 
2 Saudi Arabia 4.57 
3 Qatar 3.84 
4 Kuwait 2.66 
5 Bahrain 2.03 
6 United Arab Emirates 1.95 
7 Turkey 1.91 
8 Greece 1.64 
9 United States 1.39 
10 Republic of Korea 1.11 
 
Source:  From 2004 Statistical Compendium on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense, 
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/allied_contrib2004/allied2004.pdf, accessed 29 July 2007. 
 
 As one can clearly see, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries of the 
Middle East took the top six spots on the list.  In comparison, not a single Western 
European country broke the top ten.  It should be noted that France and Britain finished 
11th and 12th respectively, but Italy, Germany, and Spain finished 19th, 22nd, and 24th 
respectively.     
 While Western Europe’s defense expenditures have gone down since the Cold 
War, the defense expenditures in the Middle East, especially among the resource-rich 
countries, have risen sharply.  In 2005 the Middle East, together with North America, was 
the region with the greatest increase in military expenditure, a 50 percent increase since 
1996.84  Leading this effort is Saudi Arabia.  In 2005 Saudi Arabia was the eighth largest 
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country in terms of defense spending at $26.5 billion, third only to the United States and 
Israel when measuring spending per capita.85  With Germany and Italy cutting defense 
expenditures, it is totally feasible that Saudi Arabia will surpass them in the near future to 
become the sixth largest defense budget in the world.  Anthony Cordesman of the Center 
for Strategic and International Studies says, “Washington cannot – and should not – try to 
bring security to the Gulf without allies, and Saudi Arabia is the only meaningful military 
power there that can help deter and contain a steadily more aggressive Iran.”86   
2. The Use of U.S. Foreign Aid to the Middle East 
 Security assistance has been an institutionalized and continuing effort on the part 
of the United States since the end of World War II.  Now known as security cooperation, 
these efforts are intended to promote specific U.S. interests while developing friendships 
and alliances for multinational operations. 
Security assistance is foreign aid funded in the International Affairs budget, 
Function 150, which is part of discretionary spending in the federal budget.  The 
International Affairs budget is a small part of the federal budget, accounting for only 
about $30 billion in 2006,87 and is the money executed primarily by the State Department 
for international purposes.  The International Affairs budget provides monies for foreign 
aid and assistance.  The two largest aid packages the United States uses when providing 
assistance to the Middle East come in the form of Economic Support Funds and Foreign 
Military Finance dollars.   
Economic Support Funds, or ESF, are grant dollars given to a developing country 
or a country under reconstruction for the purpose of promoting economic and political 
stability.  Creating stability is intended to allow the recipient country to provide for the 
needs of its people as well as give it standing in the international community.  In 2006 the 
amount of ESF allocated worldwide was $2.616 billion, of which $1.26 billion was 
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delivered to countries in the Middle East; the money was primarily intended to be used to 
encourage democratic reform and political institution building in the Middle East and to 
target the economic despair and lack of opportunity by extremists.88 
The Foreign Military Finance program, or FMF, is also grant money intended to 
provide articles and services to support coalition partners and states critical to the Global 
War on Terror.  The result is intended to be a strengthening of security for the United 
States.  In 2006 the amount of FMF appropriated by Congress was $4.465 billion, with 
the lion’s share being given to Middle Eastern countries.  Indeed, $3.814 billion of the 
$4.465 billion in 2006 was given to Middle Eastern countries, and more specifically 
Israel ($2.257 billion), Egypt ($1.287 billion) and Jordan ($207.9 million) made up over 
98 percent of all FMF dolled out in the Middle East in 2006.89      
 Foreign aid to the Middle East began in earnest during the Nixon Administration.  
Although the United States courted Egypt after World War II, primarily in an attempt to 
keep the Egyptians from falling under Soviet influence, it was not until after the Seven 
Day War of 1967 that aid to Israel increased to a substantial amount.  In fact, Israel has 
been the recipient of the largest amount of foreign aid that the United States has given to 
any country.  From 1971 to 2005, the United States has granted Israel a total of $90.783 
billion.90  No other country comes close to receiving the amount of aid that Israel has 
received.  Aid began in earnest to Egypt after the 1979 Camp David Peace Treaty with 
Israel, and Jordan became a large recipient nation after Oslo in 1994. 
 The fallout from the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States added a new 
dimension to foreign assistance to the Middle East, as the reconstruction efforts in Iraq 
have caused the United States to ramp up assistance to that country.  By the end of 2006, 
the United States had provided about $29 billion in foreign aid for various civilian and 
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military rebuilding and security projects in Iraq following the ouster of Saddam Hussein.  
With Iraq now in need of long-term development and military assistance, many analysts 
expect aid requests for Iraqi reconstruction to continue in the near future.91 
3. Filling a Void:  Concluding Remarks 
America’s Western European allies are facing demographic crises to an extent not 
realized in the United States.  The ramifications of these challenges, as well as the way in 
which Europe is now coming to view its post Cold War role in the world primarily in 
economic versus military terms, are causing less money to be spent on each country’s 
defense establishment.  This is reason for concern for many in the senior leadership of the 
U.S. Defense Department.  Despite public comments of unity and strength in the NATO 
alliance, it is becoming increasingly clear that U.S. military operations in the Middle East 
will be undertaken with reduced support from Western European allies.   
New alliance members appear to be placing more emphasis on defense as seen in 
recent increases on defense spending.  Deploying troops to Afghanistan and Iraq is a 
positive sign that these countries are willing to support U.S.-led efforts in the region.  
However, the economies of these countries are small, and their military capabilities still 
quite limited. 
In addition to defense outlays, the United States spends a modest amount on 
foreign assistance in the region, but this money is almost exclusively earmarked for only 
three countries:  Israel, Egypt, and Jordan.  Global ESF and FMF accounted for a 
combined $7 billion in 2006, accounting for less than 0.03 percent of the total federal 
budget.  With this, the United States has influenced relations between Egypt and Israel as 
well as Jordan and Israel, and until the Palestinian elections that brought Hamas to rule, 
aid to Palestine has provided humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian people while 
allowing the Palestinian ruling regime under Yasser Arafat to legitimize itself.  Given 
funding constraints and the difficultly in persuading the American public that it is 
worthwhile to spend U.S. tax revenues on other countries, it is difficult to imagine an 
                                                 
91 Jeremy M. Sharp, “U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent 
Trends, and the FY2007 Request,” Congressional Research Service, 21 December 2006, 9.   
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increase in foreign assistance to the region, but with on-going efforts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, it is conceivable that increases are imminent. 
F. CONCLUSION 
 The Defense Department represents the largest discretionary program in the 
federal budget.  At 55 percent of total discretionary spending, it overshadows the non-
defense discretionary programs.  Since the 1960s, the portion of the federal budget 
allocated to defense spending has dropped from 52 percent to 19 percent in 2007.92  After 
the Vietnam War and the end of the Cold War, it was perceived that less money should 
be spent on defense in an effort to help balance the budget.  As a result, the defense 
budget slipped to just 3 percent of GDP. 
 As a result of 9/11 and the hawkish response to the terrorist attacks, spending for 
defense and homeland security has increased sharply.  The increase in defense spending 
over the past six years has resulted in a defense budget for FY2006 that has grown to 
almost 20 percent of federal spending and just over 4 percent of GDP.93 
 The cost of modernization, end-strength increases for the Army and the Marines, 
and healthcare for military members is creating difficult decisions for senior defense 
leaders.  Cost overruns in many of these programs are such that the services are finding it 
difficult to procure weapons systems in the quantities desired. 
 Projecting the future of defense is always a tricky endeavor.  It is difficult to 
predict the geopolitical landscape five years from now, to say nothing of 20 years from 
now.  Assuming the defense budget stays within 3 to 4 percent of GDP, however, 
provides insight into what the military may be able to achieve in future years.  With 
entitlement spending projected to grow to over 17 percent of GDP by 2030, it appears 
that the defense budget may get squeezed in the future if entitlement reform is slow to 
come. 
                                                 
92 U.S. Department of Defense, “National Defense Budget Estimates for 2007,” 
http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2007/fy2007_greenbook.pdf (accessed multiple 
times): 216 – 217. 
93 Office of Management and Budget, “President’s FY08 Budget Request to Congress,” 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy08/pdf/hist.pdf (accessed multiple times): 54. 
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 The strain put on the discretionary portion of the federal budget with the growth 
of major entitlement programs indicates that the United States will likely need assistance 
from allies if it intends to remain a presence in the Middle East for years to come.  The 
problem, it appears, is that America’s Western European allies will find it harder and 
harder to resource a force significant enough to assist the United States, suggesting an 
increased reliance on Eastern European states, Saudi Arabia and others.  But as most 
countries in Europe struggle with the consequences of an aging population as well as a 
declining population, these European governments may continue to spend less for 
defense.  This will put a burden on the United States to “go it alone” in some instances as 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 The confluence of issues facing the Middle East today could have long term 
ramifications if left unresolved.  Both the positive and negative forces of globalization are 
impacting this region.  On the one hand, globalization is creating wealth for many people.  
On the other hand, globalization has created challenges that leave many countries 
exposed to oil price shocks and the disenfranchisement of those being left behind from 
the distribution of wealth. 
 A second issue facing the Middle East today is the emergence of the younger 
generation.  This “youth bulge” constitutes a segment of society equal to about a third of 
the total population in the region.  Within the next ten years this youthful demographic, 
those aged between 15 and 24, will enter their productive years and will be in search of 
economic opportunity.  With high unemployment rates already, it is unclear whether jobs 
will exist for this group.  As a result, there are anxieties among the young and senior 
government officials arising from a fear that if opportunities do not exist, the state will be 
blamed. 
 The final issue facing the Middle East today is how to best integrate Iran into the 
regional community.  The only Shi’a dominated country in the region, Iran appears to the 
U.S. and to some of its neighbors to have regional hegemonic aspirations as well as plans 
to develop nuclear technology that can easily be converted to weapons grade material.  
Together with the fact that the U.S. State Department declares Iran as a state sponsor of 
terrorism, this puts Iran as the top foreign policy challenge for the United States 
according to the National Security Strategy. 
 All three of the issues listed above are already proving to be volatile this decade 
but will take center stage by the middle of the next decade when the “youth bulge” enters 
a productive age and Iran has developed weapons grade nuclear technology.  Combined, 
these issues will be difficult challenges for the United States. 
 If the United States could choose a time to deal with the confluence of issues that 
could foment political instability, economic stagnation, and social repression in the 
Middle East, it is difficult to imagine the middle of the next decade as that time.  Phillip 
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Longman, Ben Wattenberg, Laurence Kotlikoff and Scott Burns, and Peter Peterson all 
published books in 2004 highlighting the demographic situation that the United States 
will face in the coming years.  They argue that falling birthrates will pose significant 
challenges for the United States and her allies.  As the baby boom generation begins 
entering retirement as early as next year, a federal budget strain will ensue that will make 
it increasingly difficult to fund defense expenditures in the wake of significantly 
increased entitlement spending.  Healthcare programs are at the center of this fiscal 
storm.  The outcome for the United States, they predict, will be increased budget deficits.  
 In the introduction, this thesis pointed to three key questions.  What effect will the 
strain on entitlements have on the ability of the United States to conduct foreign policy 
abroad, primarily from a military perspective?  Will the United States struggle to 
maintain its military dominance around the globe and, most importantly, in the Middle 
East?  What challenges will the U.S. face when attempting to provide stability in this 
rather unstable region, and how will the troubles facing America at home affect its efforts 
abroad? 
 Entitlement programs in the United States – primarily Social Security, Medicare, 
and Medicaid – have provided a social safety net that has prevented many millions of 
Americans from falling into poverty.  Widely popular, these programs have become a 
permanent fixture in the federal budget since the advent of Social Security in 1935.  Over 
the years, entitlement spending has become the largest and fastest growing portion of the 
federal budget.  In 2006, entitlements constituted about 60 percent of the total federal 
budget.  As the baby boom generation enters retirement from 2008 to 2030, this number 
will only increase.  Short of reform, entitlements will consume the entire federal budget 
by the end of this period. 
 At the forefront of entitlement growth is healthcare.  An aging population, 
coupled with rising costs, use of new medical technology, and the prevalence of health 
insurance coverage have driven up the costs per beneficiary.  This has caused both 
Medicare and Medicaid to grow at a rate 2.5 percent higher than the economy for the past 
few decades.  This is unsustainable in the long run and will need to be reformed sooner 
rather than later to avoid making harder decisions in the future. 
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 Concurrent with the growth in entitlement spending is a Defense Department 
simultaneously fighting major wars in Afghanistan an Iraq while trying to transform and 
modernize itself to face the challenges of the 21st century.  A lighter, more agile, and 
more deployable force is deemed necessary, notwithstanding the decrease in the number 
of armed conflicts since the end of the Cold War.  Transforming the U.S. military into a 
conventional force capable of winning state-on-state wars while also preparing to face 
networks of non-state actors is an enormous and costly undertaking.  Personnel increases 
and cost overruns on major weapons systems have delayed the modernization effort. 
 For whatever military operations the United States finds itself in during the 21st 
century, coalitions will be as necessary as they were in the 20th century.  Most of the 
countries from Europe and Asia that the United States relied on in former coalition efforts 
appear to support U.S. efforts when they are deemed to be in the mutual interest of all 
parties, but those countries have their own challenges to deal with. 
 Almost every country in Asia and Europe that has been an ally of the United 
States since World War II is witnessing a decline in population.  This has contributed, in 
part, to the decline in defense expenditures in these countries, especially in Europe.  
Today most European countries have defense expenditures between 1.5 and 2.5 percent 
of GDP, with the lower end of that range being more prevalent.  All ten countries that 
joined the NATO alliance since 1999 have received and continue to receive military 
assistance from the United States.  To what degree this assistance has helped with their 
decisions to support U.S.-led military operations is unclear, but these countries are filling 
roles in Afghanistan and Iraq that the United States is either unwilling or unable to fill. 
 Although defense expenditures in many countries are decreasing, the defense 
budgets of friendly countries in the Middle East have grown tremendously in recent 
years.  Saudi Arabia’s defense budget makes it the world’s eighth largest country in terms 
of defense spending, and it is on the heels of both Germany and Italy to become the sixth 
largest country.  The smaller Gulf countries on the Arabian peninsula have also increased 
defense spending, but in absolute terms this amounts to a small real increase due to the 
relatively small size of these countries.   
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 This brings the thesis full circle.  Coalition efforts will be as necessary in the 
coming decades as they were in past decades, and allies in the Middle East are critical to 
any U.S. effort in the region.  Also, Central and Eastern European countries, as well as 
allies from Australia and the Pacific Rim have been notable contributors to recent efforts 
in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Western European allies of the NATO alliance have the 
economic strength to help but are placing less and less emphasis on defense expenditures 
due to other budget priorities. 
 The United States has its own budget priority issues that it must deal with.  
Entitlement reform, and more specifically healthcare reform, is necessary in the short to 
medium term.  If left unchecked, entitlement spending could consume such a large 
portion of the federal budget as to squeeze out monies necessary to not only defend the 
homeland but to promote national security interests abroad, especially as they pertain to 





APPENDIX A – COST OF OASDI (BILLIONS) 
Year Total Cost94 GDP95 % of GDP 
1990 378.33 8,674 0.0436 
1991 393.40 8,602 0.0457 
1992 406.55 8,827 0.0461 
1993 417.30 8,996 0.0464 
1994 425.56 9,318 0.0457 
1995 435.64 9,484 0.0459 
1996 440.35 9,735 0.0452 
1997 449.03 10,103 0.0444 
1998 457.84 10,475 0.0437 
1999 460.61 10,867 0.0424 
2000 470.64 11,130 0.0423 
2001 483.90 11,166 0.0433 
2002 501.30 11,368 0.0441 
2003 508.60 11,636 0.0437 
2004 518.72 12,112 0.0428 
2005 529.90 12,456 0.0425 
2006 538.18 12,836 0.0419 
2007 564.05 13,148 0.0429 
2008 572.81 13,510 0.0424 
2009 592.07 13,898 0.0426 
2010 617.59 14,296 0.0432 
2011 640.73 14,696 0.0436 
2012 669.63 15,082 0.0444 
2013 701.22 15,445 0.0454 
2014 735.13 15,809 0.0465 
2015 770.71 16,191 0.0476 
2016 805.69 16,578 0.0486 
2020 980.55 18,466 0.0531 
2025 1,226.46 21,146 0.0580 
2030 1,500.94 24,326 0.0617 
 
                                                 
94 Total Cost figures were obtained from the historical tables of the President’s FY08 Budget Request 
to Congress, located at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy08/pdf/hist.pdf, accessed multiple times.  
Figures from 1990 to 2006 were taken from this site.  Projections from 2007 to 2016 were obtained from 
the Social Security Administration website, http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR07/lr6F4.html#2, accessed 
multiple times.  All figures were converted to constant 2005 by author. 
95 GDP figures for 1990 to 2006 were obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. 
Department of Commerce website, http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/TableView.asp#Mid, accessed 
multiple times.  GDP figures for 2007 to 2030 were obtained from the Social Security Administration 
website, http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR07/lr6F4.html#2, accessed multiple times.  All figures were 
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APPENDIX B – COST OF MEDICARE (BILLIONS) 
Year Total Cost96 GDP97 % of GDP 
1990 163.68 8,674 0.0189 
1991 173.06 8,602 0.0201 
1992 189.41 8,827 0.0215 
1993 202.65 8,996 0.0225 
1994 220.91 9,318 0.0237 
1995 236.40 9,484 0.0249 
1996 247.51 9,735 0.0254 
1997 255.93 10,103 0.0253 
1998 250.55 10,475 0.0239 
1999 249.49 10,867 0.0230 
2000 254.31 11,130 0.0229 
2001 273.06 11,166 0.0245 
2002 288.52 11,368 0.0254 
2003 300.98 11,636 0.0259 
2004 323.48 12,112 0.0267 
2005 342.05 12,456 0.0275 
2006 404.70 12,836 0.0315 
2007 421.91 13,148 0.0321 
2008 444.39 13,510 0.0329 
2009 468.45 13,898 0.0337 
2010 492.07 14,296 0.0344 
2011 516.76 14,696 0.0352 
2012 545.69 15,082 0.0362 
2013 574.80 15,445 0.0372 
2014 604.81 15,809 0.0383 
2015 637.34 16,191 0.0394 
2016 672.90 16,578 0.0406 
2020 895.30 18,466 0.0485 
2025 1,279.35 21,146 0.0605 
2030 1,828.15 24,326 0.0752 
                                                 
96 Total Cost figures were obtained from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/03_NationalHealthAccountsProjected.asp#TopOfPage, 
accessed multiple times.  Figures from 1990 to 2016 were taken from this site.  Projections from 2017 to 
2030 were obtained by increasing the figure by 7.4 percent for each subsequent year.  7.4 percent was 
chosen as that is the figure the CBO projects Medicare will increase by between 2008 and 2017, according 
to their January 2007 Budget and Economic Outlook, 2008 – 2017, p. 69.  All figures were converted to 
constant 2005 by author. 
97 GDP figures for 1990 to 2006 were obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. 
Department of Commerce website, http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/TableView.asp#Mid, accessed 
multiple times.  GDP figures for 2007 to 2030 were obtained from the Social Security Administration 
website, http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR07/lr6F4.html#2, accessed multiple times.  All figures were 
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APPENDIX C – COST OF MEDICAID (BILLIONS) 
Year Total Cost98 GDP99 % of GDP 
1990 63.60 8,674 0.0073 
1991 81.32 8,602 0.0095 
1992 94.65 8,827 0.0107 
1993 103.74 8,996 0.0115 
1994 107.11 9,318 0.0115 
1995 110.44 9,484 0.0116 
1996 114.64 9,735 0.0118 
1997 115.76 10,103 0.0115 
1998 119.20 10,475 0.0114 
1999 127.00 10,867 0.0117 
2000 133.82 11,130 0.0120 
2001 146.22 11,166 0.0131 
2002 159.98 11,368 0.0141 
2003 171.25 11,636 0.0147 
2004 178.03 12,112 0.0147 
2005 178.80 12,456 0.0144 
2006 172.55 12,836 0.0134 
2007 180.78 13,148 0.0138 
2008 190.24 13,510 0.0141 
2009 200.48 13,898 0.0144 
2010 211.59 14,296 0.0148 
2011 223.64 14,696 0.0152 
2012 236.68 15,082 0.0157 
2013 250.54 15,445 0.0162 
2014 265.38 15,809 0.0168 
2015 281.18 16,191 0.0174 
2016 297.74 16,578 0.0180 
2020 402.08 18,466 0.0218 
2025 585.34 21,146 0.0277 
2030 852.12 24,326 0.0350 
                                                 
98 Total Cost figures were obtained from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/03_NationalHealthAccountsProjected.asp#TopOfPage, 
accessed multiple times.  Figures from 1990 to 2016 were taken from this site.  Projections from 2017 to 
2030 were obtained by increasing the figure by 7.8 percent for each subsequent year.  7.8 percent was 
chosen as that is the figure the CBO projects Medicaid will increase by between 2008 and 2017, according 
to their January 2007 Budget and Economic Outlook, 2008 – 2017, p. 69.  All figures were converted to 
constant 2005 by author. 
99 GDP figures for 1990 to 2006 were obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. 
Department of Commerce website, http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/TableView.asp#Mid, accessed 
multiple times.  GDP figures for 2007 to 2030 were obtained from the Social Security Administration 
website, http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR07/lr6F4.html#2, accessed multiple times.  All figures were 
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APPENDIX D – DEFENSE OUTLAYS (BILLIONS) 
Year TOA100 3% GDP 3.5% GDP 4% GDP GDP101 
1990 430.53    8,674 
1991 436.27    8,602 
1992 394.80    8,827 
1993 366.50    8,996 
1994 334.87    9,318 
1995 331.93    9,484 
1996 325.55    9,735 
1997 317.74    10,103 
1998 315.38    10,475 
1999 324.23    10,867 
2000 332.25    11,130 
2001 345.33    11,166 
2002 388.81    11,368 
2003 460.88    11,636 
2004 471.03    12,112 
2005 502.34    12,456 
2006 456.94    12,836 
2007  394.44 460.18 525.92 13,148 
2008  405.30 472.85 540.40 13,510 
2009  416.94 486.43 555.92 13,898 
2010  428.88 500.36 571.84 14,296 
2011  440.88 514.36 587.84 14,696 
2012  452.45 527.86 603.27 15,082 
2013  463.36 540.59 617.82 15,445 
2014  474.28 553.33 632.37 15,809 
2015  485.74 566.70 647.66 16,191 
2016  497.34 580.23 663.12 16,578 
2020  553.98 646.31 738.64 18,466 
2025  634.38 740.11 845.84 21,146 
2030  729.79 851.42 973.06 24,326 
 
                                                 
100 Total Obligational Authority figures were obtained from the 2007 Greenbook of the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense Comptroller, located at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2007/fy2007_greenbook.pdf, accessed multiple times.  
Figures from 1990 to 2006 were taken from this site.  Projections from 2007 to out years were calculated 
by author.  All figures were converted to constant 2005 by author. 
101 GDP figures for 1990 to 2006 were obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. 
Department of Commerce website, http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/TableView.asp#Mid, accessed 
multiple times.  GDP figures for 2007 to 2030 were obtained from the Social Security Administration 
website, http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR07/lr6F4.html#2, accessed multiple times.  All figures were 
converted to constant 2005 by author. 
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